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INTRODUCTION
A joint venture is a form of business association used by corpo-
rations to advance a variety of strategic objectives. By facilitating
cooperation between partners with complementary goals, they have
been employed to increase access to new markets, to acquire new
technologies, to diversify investment risk and to expand or rational-
ize production capacity.' Joint ventures are also recognized by gov-
ernments as a legitimate means to realize more general economic
objectives.2 Increasingly of late, this recognition has raised the
question of the proper treatment of joint ventures under competition
and antitrust laws.3
1. For a detailed analysis of the varied uses of joint ventures and other forms of
industrial cooperation, see TIMOTHY M. COLLINS & THOMAS L. DOORLEY III, TEAMING UP
FOR THE 90S (1991) [hereinafter COLLINS & DOORLEY]; THE HANDBOOK OF JOINT
VENTURING (John D. Carter et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter JOINT VENTURING]; KATHRYN R.
HARRIGAN, MANAGING FOR JOINT VENTURE SUCCESS (1984) [hereinafter HARRIGAN].
2. For this theme in the European Community, see infra part I(B)-(D). For the legal
treatment ofjoint ventures in the United States, see, e.g., The National Cooperative Re-
search Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §4301 (1988); Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Interna-
tional Operations, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 at 890 (Nov. 17, 1988)
[hereinafter Guidelines for International Operations].
3. For a discussion of the antitrust question in the United States, see James Langen-
feld and David Scheffman, Innovation and U.S. Competition Policy, 34 THE ANTITRUST
BUuzrI 1 (1989); James F. Rill, United States Antitrust Policy in International Trade:
Legislative Proposals Concerning Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures, in
1992 AND EEC/U.S. COMPETITION AND TRADE LAW 131 (Barry Hawk ed., 1990). On the
antitrust treatment ofjoint ventures in other countries, see ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
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In the European Community (E.C.),4 the task of articulating a
coherent competition policy has been the responsibility of the Euro-
pean Commission. The content of the policy assumed increased
significance in 1985, when the Commission presented a White Pa-
per 6 on the completion of an internal Community market to the
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION POLICY AND JOINT VENTURES (1988).
4. The European Economic Community was established in 1957 by the Treaty of
Rome. "By establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic
policies of Member States," its objective was "to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increase in trade, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations be-
tween the States belonging to it." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY AS AMENDED BY SUBSEQUENT TREATIES art. 2 [hereinafter EEC TREATY], re-
printed in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS (Bernard Rudden & Derrick Wyatt eds., 2d ed. 1986).
Moreover, the Treaty Contains provisions for the abolition of all barriers to the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. EEC TREATY art. 3. The European Eco-
nomic Community will be referred to throughout this Comment simply as the European
Community, the E.C. or the common market.
5. The EEC Treaty established four principal institutions: the Commission, the
Council, the Parliament and the Court of Justice. EEC TREATY art. 4. For a general sur-
vey of E.C. institutions see WILLEM MOLLE, THE ECONOMICs OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
55-79 (1990). The Commission is a body of seventeen members each appointed for four
years by consent of the governments of the Member States. It acts as a supranational
body whose role is "to propose new policies and laws, to act as a watchdog concerning in-
fringements of EEC law, to mediate between Member States in the Council and to repre-
sent the EEC in external relations." FRANCIS G. SNYDER, EEC LAw SUBJECT GUIDE 17
(1990). Article 155 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common mar-
ket, the Commission shall:
ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the insti-
tutions pursuant thereto are applied;
formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this
Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary;,
have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures taken
by the Council and by the Assembly in the manner provided for in this Treaty;
exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the
rules laid down by the latter.
EEC TREATY art. 155.
The Commission has broad authority to ensure that competition is not distorted in
the common market. If it finds that there has been a competitive distortion, it shall pro-
pose appropriate measures to bring it to an end. EEC TREATY art. 85. The Commission's
competence in competition matters is addressed specifically in Council Regulation 17/62
of 6 February 1962, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
Amended by Regulation 59, by Regulation 118/63 and by Regulation 2822/71, 1971 O.J.
(285) 49 [hereinafter Council Regulation 17/621.
6. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Council, COM(85)310 final, reprinted in AUDREY WINTER, ROBERT D. SLOAN,
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European Council.7 The White Paper contained proposals for the
integration of the economies of the Member States8 into a single
market without physical, technical or fiscal barriers.9
The deadline set for the elimination of these barriers passed
without fanfare on December 31, 1992. It was always understood,
however, that the successful completion of the single market would
be a gradual process that would require the continuing commitment
of the Member States to the economic ideals enshrined in the White
Paper, namely, economic integration, efficiency, innovation and
long-term competitiveness. The Commission has continually stated
that joint ventures have an important role to play in realizing these
ideals.
The international dimensions of the single market have been
analyzed closely by the U.S. business community,10 which, despite
initial concerns," has for the most part, responded positively to
GEORGE A. LEHNER & VANESSA RUIZ, EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A LAWYER's GUIDE
app. A (1989) [hereinafter Completing the Internal Market]. The White Paper reaffirms
the general provisions of the EEC TREATY, for the abolition of all barriers to the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital.
7. The European Council, which formulates most of the important policies of the
Community, was created outside of the EEC Treaty. Article 2 of the Single European Act
grants the European Council its authority. See BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, 20 (Bernard
Rudden & Derrick Wyatt eds., 2d ed. 1986).
8. The member states are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and United Kingdom.
9. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 6, at 4-8. For a detailed analysis of
the framework of the integration proposal, see Commission of the European Communi-
ties, The Economics of 1992, 35 EUR. EcON. 17 (1988) [hereinafter Commission, The Eco-
nomics of 1992]. See also PAOLO CECCHiNI et al., THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE
BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MARKET (1988) [hereinafter CECCHINI, et al.].
The general objectives of the Commission's White Paper on the completion of the in-
ternal market were incorporated into the Treaty of Rome by the Single European Act of
1986. The Treaty now provides that:
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establish-
ing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992....
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accor-
dance with provisions of this Treaty.
EEC TREATY, art. 8A (as amended 1987).
10. The interest of the United States in the development of the European Commu-
nity can be traced to attempts following the Second World War to encourage greater eco-
nomic and political cooperation among European nations as a means of preventing a re-
surgence of German nationalism. The Marshall Plan "was not only an economic package
but also a stage toward European political and economic unification. American leaders
were among the first to recognize that cohesion was a prerequisite condition for any eco-
nomic recovery." RENE SCHWOK, U.S.-E.C. RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:
CONFICT OR PARTNERSHIP 9 (1991).
11. In particular, U.S. firms worried about the lack of U.S. participation in the stan-
1993] COOPERATIVE JOINT VENTURES 997
European Community economic integration.12 A larger and more ef-
ficient market was widely perceived to promise benefits to exporters
and to multinationals already established in the E.C.3 Its evolution
has brought broader economic change which presents opportunities
for U.S. firms that can be exploited through joint ventures with E.C.
partners.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the economic poten-
tial of U.S.-E.C. cooperative joint ventures within the framework of
the single market program and the E.C. competition rules. Section I
sets the context by considering briefly the wider economic objectives
of the single market program and the role of joint ventures in realiz-
ing these objectives. Section II uses the recently adopted Notice on
Cooperative Joint Ventures" as a guide to present a legal analysis of
the competition issues raised by joint ventures in the E.C."5 Section
IH examines how U.S. corporations can use joint ventures with E.C.
partners to advance their own commercial objectives within the
Community by helping to shape the outcome of the ongoing integra-
tion process. Finally, the conclusion speculates as to the role this
type of cooperation may play in the international economy in the
future.
dard-setting process for B.C. products, the public procurement policies of the govern-
ments of the member states and the proposed rules of origin and local content for prod-
ucts sold in the Community. See Europe 1992: Administration Views: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East, and on International Economic Policy and
Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 30 (1990) (statement of Roger Wallace, Deputy Undersecretary for International
Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce).
12. See SCHWOK, supra note 10, at 53 ("Almost all vested professional associations,
big enterprises, the administration, and the Congress have published detailed studies of
the impact of E.C.-1992 on the U.S. economy and have concluded that there are no rea-
sons to fear the B.C. internal market."). For an analysis of how E.C. policies will affect
U.S. interests in various industrial sectors, see EUROPE 1992: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
(GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ed., 1990) [hereinafter EUROPE 1992].
13. See SCHWOK, supra note 10, at 53-58.
14. Commission Notice Concerning the Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures
Pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 1993 O.J. (C 43) 2 [hereinafter Notice on Coop-
erative Joint Ventures]. See also Commission Notice, Guidelines for the appraisal of coop-
erative joint ventures in the light of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty [hereinafter Draft No-
tice on Cooperative Joint Ventures] (on file with author). Discussion Paper on the Future
Treatment of Cooperative Joint Ventures [hereinafter Discussion Paper] (on file with
author).
15. The Commission Notice is not legally binding on the courts of Member States but
"constitutes a factor which the national courts can take into account when deciding a dis-
pute before them." Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 3. While it is
not controlling authority, as a practical matter it will be given great weight by national
courts. The sources of B.C. competition law and their legal effect together with the ques-
tions of the relationship between the Commission and the national courts of Member
States and the relationship between national competition law and B.C. competition law
are discussed infra at part II(A)C1)-(3).
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I. ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE E.C.
A- Joint Ventures Defined
The Commission defines joint ventures broadly as
"undertakings that are jointly controlled by several other undertak-
ings, the parent companies." 6 More specifically, however, it has dis-
tinguished two types ofjoint ventures. The first "concentrative" type,
more commonly termed a "concentration," refers to a collaborative
undertaking which functions on a lasting basis as an autonomous
economic entity responsible for its own commercial policy and which
involves no coordination of competitive behavior either between the
parents themselves or between them and the joint venture. 17 The
second "cooperative" type is a collaborative venture not deemed con-
centrative in the aforementioned sense because its purpose or effect
is to coordinate the competitive behavior of firms which remain in-
dependent." A cooperative joint venture, in other words, involves
the coordination of competition between the parent companies or
between the parent companies and their joint venture.
"Concentrative" and "cooperative" joint ventures are terms of art in
E.C. competition law.' 9 In this Comment, however, the term "joint
venture" is used to refer solely to cooperative joint ventures.
Although parent companies typically structure a joint venture
16. Commission Notice Regarding the Concentrative and Cooperative Operations
Under Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (C 203) 10, 10 [hereinafter Commission Notice on Con-
trol of Concentrations].
17. Id. at 11-12.
18. See Draft Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 1. In compari-
son, a concentration occurs when the parent companies transfer certain business assets to
the joint venture and permanently withdraw from the market in which it is to operate.
Commission Notice on Control of Concentrations, supra note 16, at 13. Permanent with-
drawal reduces the risk of bringing the joint venture into the "cooperative" category. Con-
centrative joint ventures are termed "mergers" when the parent companies transfer their
entire activities to the venture. Id.
19. The distinction between concentrations or mergers and cooperative joint ven-
tures has important substantive and procedural consequences. The legality of a concen-
tration is judged by criteria set forth in Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, [hereinafter Control of Con-
centrations Regulation]. Cooperative joint ventures are assessed under EEC TREATY art.
85 and other relevant Regulations and Notices. See infra part II. The rules governing co-
operative joint ventures may also be applied to other forms of association which "produce
effects on competition similar to those ofjoint ventures.... Examples include the acqui-
sition of a minority holding, unilateral, multilateral or reciprocal, whether or not it en-
tails representation on the various bodies of the firms concerned." Draft Notice on Coop-
erative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 1. The rationale is that the relationship betveen
the parties in such circumstances creates a structure which "may ... serve as a means of
influencing the behaviour of the firms concerned in such a way as to restrict or distort
competition on the market in which those firms operate" Id. at 21.
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on the basis of equal equity ownership, the Commission eschews a
formalistic approach to the question of control."0 It looks beyond the
ownership structure of the company to consider the issue in light of
the role of the parties in the management of the enterprise. Factors
considered relevant include the ownership of the assets, influence
over the composition of the supervisory and management boards,
voting rights within these boards and contracts involving the man-
agement of the business."' For example, a contractual provision that
both parties consent to important strategic decisions is sufficient to
give de facto joint control to a party with only a minority voting in-
terest.22 In addition, a joint venture does not require the existence of
a distinct incorporated entity and may as easily be a relationship
based on a series of contracts.' 3
Within the category of cooperative joint ventures, a further
distinction can be drawn between partial-function and full-function
joint ventures.' The former, as their name implies, merely carry out
certain limited functions of the parent companies such as their sales
or purchasing activities.' The latter are independent enterprises
that "perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity...
where they give rise to coordination of competitive behaviour by the
parents in relation to each other or the joint venture."26 Both types of
joint venture, moreover, may operate up or downstream of their par-
ents or in markets identical or adjacent to theirs. Thus, they intro-
duce a degree of flexibility into the corporate organization that
permits the parent companies to combine their interests in varied
ways at different stages in the product chain. For this reason, they
have proven to be particularly versatile at enabling them to adapt to
the far-reaching effects of the Commission's single market program.
B. The Single Market Program
The outlines of the single market were presented in the Coin-
20. Commission Notice on Control of Concentrations, supra note 16, at 11. Control is
defined as "the possibility of exercising, directly or indirectly, a decisive influence on the
activities of the joint venture." Id.
21. Id.
22. See Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, 1987 O.J. (L 41) 31, 35 (minority shareholder who
provided key technology and participated on a equal footing with the majority share-
holder in the shareholders' committee held to be a full partner which shared control).
23. See, e.g., GEC-Weir Sodium Circulators, 1977 O.J. (L 327) 26, 27 ("Mhe contrac-
tual dispositions made by the parties have all the most essential characteristics of a joint
venture; in that they provide for the unified, joint and equal control by the parties of all
their activities relating to sodium circulators, including planning, financing, research, de-
velopment, construction and sale.").
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mission's White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market.27
This document was informed by two simple ideas. First, the frag-
mentation of the E.C. by artificial trade barriers 8 had resulted in
the misallocation and inefficient use of resources with detrimental
effects upon the Community Members' levels of productivity, inno-
vation and international competitiveness.29 Second, the elimination
of these barriers would provide the impetus for structural economic
change that, in turn, would lead to the creation of more efficient and
innovative firms better able to compete in international markets.30
The stimulus to economic improvement would be the competi-
tion unleashed within each Member State when, with the abolition
of trade barriers, European companies were deprived of protection
in their domestic markets.31 The new climate would serve as a cata-
lyst of the E.C.'s economic integration. Undistorted by artificial bar-
riers, competition would stimulate better utilization of existing ca-
pacity by forcing firms to operate at greater efficiency. As the less
efficient firms were driven out of business, increased competition
would break down existing market structures to reallocate and ra-
tionalize resources across entire industries. Ultimately, it would
shift resources between Member States to those which enjoyed a
comparative advantage in particular products.2 Competition would
27. See Completing the Internal Market, supra note 6.
28. Such barriers include frontier delays, tariffs, quantitative restrictions, mar-
ket-entry restrictions, discriminatory public procurement practices, divergent product
standards and market distorting subsidies. See Commission, The Economics of 1992, su.
pr note 9, at 21, 33.
29. According to the Commission, international competitiveness and product
innovation require an open domestic market and "production units which can without
difficulty serve a unified market which is perfectly integrated as regards standards and
marketing requirements." Id. at 25. Small protected national markets for many products
in the Community, on the other hand, minimize incentives for innovation and discourage
companies from investing in technology which would run at optimal efficiency. As a direct
result, the innovative capacity and productivity of Community firms generally lagged be-
hind that of their major competitors.
30. Id. The Commission is particularly concerned about the E.C.'s failure to keep
pace with its competitors in high technology industries such as data-processing, electrical
goods, precision instruments and electronics.
31. COMUISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 11 (1991) [hereinafter XXTH REPORT] ("The full benefits of the internal market in
terms of higher output, growth and employment can only be attained if competition in-
tensifies as a result of the dismantling of the barriers to trade that still remain.").
32. The general scheme is presented more fully in CECCHINI, et al., supra note 9, at
84. As a result of this process, it is estimated that the Community's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) will increase by 4.3 to 6.4 percent. Id. However, these estimates have also
been criticized as being overly optimistic. See Merton J. Peck, Industrial Organization
and the Gains from 1992, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIVITY 277 (1989). See also
RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GROWTH EFFECTS OF 1992 248 (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search Working Paper No. 3119 1989) (arguing that even greater gains can be expected).
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also create the best incentive for firms to innovate: the surest means
of commercial success would be the introduction of new and better
products.3 Thus, the ideal of the single market program was a vir-
tuous circle of "competition which stimulates European innovation
and innovation [which] in turn stimulates European competitiv-
ity."
3 4
Though the primary consideration, increasing competition was
not the Commission's sole economic objective. 5 Another strain of
reasoning emphasized the need for an environment conducive to in-
terfirm cooperation, one aimed at strengthening "the industrial and
commercial fabric of the internal market."3 16 This goal would be ac-
complished, for example, by encouraging cooperative research and
development37 and alliances, particularly between small to me-
dium-sized firms, enabling the partners to exploit the opportunities
created by the enlarged market.3 8 The Commission also stressed the
33. As stated by the Commission:
It is ... widely accepted that competition policy will have to underpin the single
market.... Continuous exposure to competition should be a feature of the envi-
ronment in which European companies operate: it will make sure that they ac-
tively pursue innovation, stay attuned to the market, keep an eye on costs and
avoid waste. This will, of course, benefit not only the consumer in the form of
more, better and cheaper products and services, but also industry itself: Euro-
pean companies will not be competitive in world markets without competition at
home.
COMi ISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
199140 (1992) [hereinafter XXIST REPORT].
34. CECCHINI, et al., supra note 9, at 86.
35. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XVIITH REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY 13 (1988) [hereinafter XVIITH REPORT]) ("The overall economic policy of
the Community has the threefold aim of promoting a cooperative strategy for the creation
of employment, of strengthening economic and social cohesion and of achieving an inter-
nal market by... 1992.").
36. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 6, at 34. See also CECCHINI, et al.,
supra note 9, at xi ("This large market without frontiers, because of its size and because
of the possibilities that it offers for scientific, technical and commercial cooperation, gives
a unique opportunity to our industry to improve its competitivity.").
37. See, e.g., Commission, The Economics of 1992, supra note 9, at 25 (expressing the
view that "the critical mass for R&D is considerable and requires the active cooperation if
not the integration of European firms if the Community is to match the level and effec-
tiveness of expenditure in this area by American and Japanese companies").
38. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2821/71 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices modified by
Regulation 2743/72 of 19 December 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 291) 144, 147 ("[The creation of a
common market requires that undertakings be adapted to the conditions of the enlarged
market and.., cooperation between undertakings can be a suitable means of achieving
this."); Commission Notice Concerning Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices in
the Field of Cooperation Between Enterprises, 1968 O.J. (C 84) 14, 14 [hereinafter 1968
Notice] ("[Clooperation among large enterprises can be economically beneficial without
presenting difficulties from the angle of competition policy."); Commission, The Economics
of 1992, supra note 9, at 137 ("Cooperation between small and medium-sized European
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need for the abolition of internal barriers to be accompanied by ac-
tion to "strengthen research and the technological base of the Com-
munity's industry3 9 and expressed the willingness to make Com-
munity funds available for future research programs and pilot pro-
jects.'
Although competition and cooperation are complementary
rather than antithetical concepts,4' the precise nature of their rela-
tionship is difficult to define. By way of clarification, a useful anal-
ogy is the Commission policy of allowing state aid to industry only
where there is an adequate compensatory justification, that is, an
objective specified under the Treaty 2 which could not be attained by
the recipients under normal market conditions. Aid under these cir-
cumstances "promote[s] recognized Community objectives and doles]
not frustrate the move towards the internal market."43 Although
joint ventures and other forms of cooperation between private par-
firms will facilitate market entry and allow them to move on from the Community market
to the world market.").
A survey of business attitudes towards the single market program concluded that
"[iln order to meet the requirements of a completely open market measures to improve
productivity rank first but they are almost matched by the share of firms regarding coop-
eration agreements with companies in other member countries to be necessary." Gernot
Nerb, The Completion of the Internal Market, in 3 RESEARCH ON THE "COST OF
NON-EUROPE": BASIC FINDINGS 38 (1988).
39. Commission, The Economics of 1992, supra note 9, at 7.
40. Id. at 34-35. For an assessment of such programs, see Europe's Technology Pol-
icy: How Not To Catch Up, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1993, at 19-21.
41. According to the Commission:
The task of competition policy must be to give impetus to this integration by facilitat-
ing cross-frontier cooperation, for instance in the form of joint ventures which benefit
others besides the participants, whilst dismantling those obstacles to a unified market
erected artificially by undertakings or governments.
XVIITH REPORT, supra note 35, at 14.
42. EEC TREATY art. 92 (3).
The following, from Art. 92 (3), may be considered to be compatible with the common
market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of
living is abnormally low or where there is serious underdevelopment;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European
interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to
an extent contrary to the common interest;...
Id-
43. XXTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 125. For a detailed discussion of state aids see
Andrew Evans, Socially Acceptable Distortions of Competition: Community Policy on State
Aid, 16 EUR. LAW REv. 79 (1991) (concluding that "Community policy has been to give
preference to the unaided market if possible, as a way of organizing trade...but the
Commission will accept distortions of competition to speed the rate at which markets
move toward long-run, competitive, equilibrium").
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ties raise slightly different issues, they should likewise be consid-
ered in the context of their capacity to promote the goals and
long-term benefits of the single market, namely, economic integra-
tion, efficiency, innovation and competitiveness." As a rule, they are
permitted when these benefits provide adequate compensatory jus-
tification for any short-term competitive loss.45
C. Economic Rationale of Joint Ventures
The Commission's recognition that, although joint ventures are
established by the partners for their own private benefit, they often
have beneficial spin-off effects in the wider economy is consistent
with the foregoing.46 Broadly, the Commission considers that joint
ventures are important vehicles of production and innovation effi-
ciencies.47 Subject to the constraints discussed in Part H(C)(1)-(4), its
policy has been to encourage interfirm cooperation as an essential
instrument of economic integration, efficiency and competitiveness.
The following subsections consider briefly some of the ways in which
44. See Commission of the European Communities, XVITH REPORT 43 (1987)
[hereinafter XVITH REPORT]:
The Commission's approach to joint ventures...and other forms of industrial co-
operation is designed to ensure that the right balance is struck between the
need for coordination of industrial effort in order to increase the competitive-
ness of European industry and to create a single market and the necessity of
ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted and allowed to
fulfil its function of bringing about a more efficient allocation of resources.
Id.
45. See, e.g., Re Bayer/Gist Brocades, 1976 O.J. (L 30) 13 ("The question of a contri-
bution to economic progress... can only arise in those exceptional cases where the free
play of competition is unable to produce the best result economically speaking."); Optical
Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L 236) 30, 38 ("The distortion of competition is, however, outweighed by
the benefits to which these joint ventures give rise."); Rockwell/Iveco, 1983 O.J. (L 224)
19, 28 ("'IThe advantages resulting from this cooperation outweigh considerably the
harmful effects it entails.").
46. See Commission of the European Communities, XV REPORT 42 (1986)
[hereinafter XV REPORT]. Such effects include:
Ci) integration of the internal market, especially by means of cross-border coop-
eration; (ii) facilitation of risky investments; (iii) promotion of innovation and
transfer of technology;, (iv) development of new markets; (v) improvement of the
competitiveness of Community industry;, (vi) strengthening the competitive po-
sition of small and medium-sized firms; and (vii) elimination of structural over-
capacity.
Id.
47. The employment of resources is productively efficient "when goods are produced
using the most cost-effective combination of productive resources available under existing
technology." Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987). Innovation ef-
ficiencies are "achieved through the invention, development, and diffusion of new prod-
ucts and production processes that increase social wealth." Id.
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joint ventures advance these objectives.
1. Industrial Restructuring. Joint ventures have performed an
important role in the rationalization of mature E.C. industries. They
have allowed the Commission to exercise a degree of control over the
restructuring process so that, though largely left to market forces,
adjustments have occurred in an orderly fashion.48 In a series of De-
cisions and Notices in the mid-1980's, the Commission allowed ma-
jor corporations to use the joint venture as a vehicle to restructure
the Community's petro-chemical sector. Moreover, its treatment of
this process gives an indication of how it might approach the re-
structuring of other industries in the enlarged market.4 9
Against a background of structural overcapacity and increasing
international competition, the Commission determined that losses in
the petro-chemical sector could not be sustained in the medium to
long-term. In an attempt to place the industry on a sounder footing
it approved a number of joint ventures and cooperation agreements
that were designed to eliminate certain participants from the mar-
ket. Brushing aside the short-term anticompetitive effect of the ar-
rangements, the Commission reasoned that cooperation would ac-
complish the necessary steps in the inevitable restructuring process
"more quickly and radically"0 than unrestricted competition and,
further, would "accelerate the tendency to re-establish the equilib-
rium in supply and demand."," It concluded that rationalization of
capacity through a joint venture, rather than through competition,
was more likely to establish a healthy industrial structure that was
"able both to run at efficient capacity loadings and to earn sufficient
48. The statement assumes that this goal is a legitimate objective of the competition
authorities. Former Commissioner of Competition, Peter Sutherland has stated that "[in
the long term it must be possible for industrial restructuring to take place smoothly. That
is why within the framework of competition policy, the Commission takes a positive ap-
proach towards programmes of industrial restructuring." EXPLOITING THE INTERNAL
MARKET. CO-OPERATION AND COMPETITION TOWARD 1992 104 (P.J. Slot et al. eds., 1988).
Use of the joint venture in this fashion is analogous to the failing firm defense rec-
ognized in federal antitrust law. See, e.g., Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346
(1962).
49. The Commission noted that the integration of national markets would have a
varying impact on industries such as food-processing, pharmaceuticals, telecommunica-
tions equipment and automobiles. See generally Commission, The Economics of 1992, su-
pra note 9. For an example of the anticipated scenario, see CECCHINI et al, supra note 9,
at 54 ("Dynamic gains in industrial efficiency should be heralded by the removal of in-
tra-EC trade barriers. The European food industry... will likely undergo restructuring
and consolidation... European food companies have by and large remained nationally fo-
cused. If they do not react to the pressures from trade deregulation by restructuring,
E.C.-based food companies may get left behind.").
50. ENIlMontedison,1987 O.J. (C 217) 2, 18.
51. BP Chemicals Ltd/ICI, 1984 O.J. (L 212) 1, 8.
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profits to finance future investments and research and develop-
ment.
52
The petro-chemical cases present a paradigm of the type of
structural change through industrial cooperation that the Commis-
sion sees as essential to the success of the single market. The com-
panies involved had determined where their relative strengths lay;53
they closed or disposed of peripheral businesses and focused their ef-
forts in specialized areas;' they kept open only the more efficient
plants and reallocated production to optimize transport costs. 5 In
adopting these measures, the parties were able "to liberate resources
to finance long-term investment and research and development
rather than to cover operating costs." 56
2. Rationalization and Synergy. Joint ventures are not confined
to large multinational companies seeking to eliminate excess capac-
ity and to promote specialization across an entire industry. More
frequently, they are undertaken on a smaller scale and motivated
merely by the desire to rationalize reduplicated activities by exploit-
ing the potential for synergies between the partners. In Alcatel
Espace IANT Nachrichtentechnik,57 for example, the Commission
noted four ways in which two companies seeking to develop satel-
lites and component technology could become more efficient by
pooling their resources. First, research and development expendi-
ture could be utilized more efficiently if one company was not con-
stantly reduplicating the efforts of the other. Second, new products
could be developed more rapidly through cooperation. Third, the
concentration of resources would facilitate a degree of specialization
allowing the parties to develop a broader range of products. Finally,
higher quality equipment could be supplied at lower cost.58
In a similar context, the Commission has pointed to the effi-
ciency gains which can be realized by allowing small and me-
dium-sized companies to cooperate with the aim of increasing pro-
ductivity and competitiveness.59 For example, in Transocean Marine
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 3.
54. ENI/Montedison, 1987 O.J. (L 5) 13, 15.
55. Enichem/ICI, 1987 O.J. (C 217) 2,4.
56. BP Chemicals Ltd/ICI, 1984 O.J. (L 212) 1, 8.
57. Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik, 1990 O.J. (L 32) 19.
58. Id. at 24. See also UIP, 1989 O.J. (L 226) 25, 31 (the creation of a joint venture by
three independent film producers made possible "a more effective and rationalized distri-
bution of the product of the parent companies" through the avoidance of duplicated distri-
bution networks and the reduction of centralized administrative costs).
59. See 1968 Notice, supra note 38, at 14. To facilitate such cooperation the Com-
mission has issued a Notice whose effects are presumptively negligible from a competition
standpoint. See Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not
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Paint Organization, the Commission reasoned that "[t]he pooling
and coordination of individual distribution networks... is a suitable
and indeed necessary means of enriching the range of goods on offer,
improving sales structures... and promoting intensive competi-
tion." 0 The Commission also wishes to encourage small and me-
dium-sized companies to use such ventures as a springboard for
their activities in the world market.'
3. Technological Innovation. Joint ventures are not merely ve-
hicles of rationalization and production efficiency. They also serve a
more positive function by facilitating the development of new prod-
ucts which substantially contribute to the state of the art in a par-
ticular technology. This concern is paramount in several of the
Commission's most important Decisions: Carbon Gas Technologie, 2
Rockwell /Iveco,' Optical Fibres," BBC Brown Boveri65 and
KSB/GouldsILowara/ITT.6 The principal issue raised in each case
was whether the cooperation between the parent companies would
enhance the prospect of successful innovation in E.C. industry. The
Commission responded affirmatively in each case, placing great
weight in its analysis on the benefits of facilitating access to com-
plementary technical know-how. However, even in these circum-
stances, it was also relevant that the object of each venture would be
attained more rapidly and efficiently through the partners' coopera-
tion.
Both interests are well illustrated by Carbon Gas Technologie,
a case which concerned the joint development of new coal gasifica-
tion technology by three firms each of whom, it was acknowledged,
might have been able to develop the product alone.67 The Commis-
sion nevertheless reasoned that cooperation was preferable to com-
petition because each party could contribute its own expertise in one
area of the given technology. "In view of this existing complementary
specialization of the parties, their cooperation within the framework
of a joint subsidiary creates, by ruling out competition between
them, better conditions for the attainment of the object of the coop-
Fall Under Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
1986 O.J. (C 231) 2 [hereinafter Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance].
60. Transocean Marine Paint Organization, 1988 O.J. (L 351) 40. See also Teko, 1990
O.J. (L 13) 34.
61. See, e.g., Commission, The Economics of 1992, supra note 9, at 137.
62. 1983 O.J. (L 376) 17.
63. 1983 O.J. (L 224) 19.
64. 1986 O.J. (L 236) 30.
65. 1988 O.J. (L 301) 68.
66. 1991 O.J. (L 19) 25.
67. 1984 O.J. (L 376) 17.
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eration than if they were to compete with one another."6 Further,
coordination of their respective skills would accelerate the transition
from the planning stage to that of large scale industrial production.6 9
4. Market Integration. As explained in section B, the Commis-
sion believes that market integration is best effected by competition
undistorted by trade barriers between Member States.70 Under ap-
propriate circumstances, however, the goal of market integration is
advanced with equal efficiency through cooperation between erst-
while or prospective competitors. A case in point is Mitchell
Cotts/Sofiltra.7' Sofiltra Poelman SA, a French company, and M.C.
Engineering (UK) established a joint venture to manufacture and
market high efficiency air filters. Under their agreement, Sofiltra
granted the venture an exclusive know-how license to manufacture
the microfine glass fiber which was the key component in the filtra-
tion devices. Although the grant of the license excluded competing
licensees in the United Kingdom, the Commission reasoned that the
creation of the joint venture obviated the need for Sofiltra to estab-
lish its own manufacturing base there and thereby saved it
"substantial uneconomic expenditure."72 Thus, Sofiltra gained the
benefits of a stronger foothold in the United Kingdom where it had a
very small market share without incurring the usual preliminary
start-up costs.73
D. Joint Ventures and Industrial Policy
There has been much debate in recent years concerning the
desirability of a centrally coordinated, Community-wide, industrial
policy. Typical candidates for such a policy include protection for
"strategic" industries against "unfair" foreign competition; state
subsidies to aid innovation in key technologies; and the promotion of
self-styled European champions as competitors in the global econ-
omy.74 A majority of the Commission Members, however, has re-
68. Id. at 20. See also Rockwell/Iveco, 1983 O.J. (L 224) 19, 25 ("The joint exploitation
of complementary industrial know-how by a specialist axle-manufacturer and an experi-
enced truck manufacturer should contribute to increased technical progress in the goods
concerned"); BBC Brown Boveri, 1988 O.J. (L 301) 68, 72 ("The cooperation between BBC
and NGK is aimed at developing a fundamental technological innovation, which can be
done more quickly and cheaply on a collaborative basis").
69. Carbon Gas Tectmologie, 1983 O.J. (L 376) 17,20.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
71. Mitchell CottslSofiltra, 1987 O.J. (L 41) 31.
72. Id. at 34.
73. Id.
74. The issue of industrial policy has been the subject of disagreement in the Com-
mission, among Community institutions -and among different Member States. See
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sisted calls for an interventionist stance towards industrial strategy.
It has focused its efforts instead on ensuring "an open trade policy,
completion of the internal market and an active competition pol-
icy."75 This laissez-faire approach has not gained unanimous accep-
tance. Many groups have advocated a more active role for the
Commission in determining industrial and social priorities through,
for example, less aggressive application of the competition rules or
the grant of subsidies to strategic sectors.7
A joint venture policy, implemented with a view to the wider
Treaty objectives, permits the Commission to integrate the concerns
of the interventionists with its own market-oriented approach. 7
Within the framework of workable competition, joint ventures can be
used as vehicles of structural adjustment and innovation in a man-
ner which encourages specific government policies without the need
for protection and public subsidies that would unduly distort the
Europe's Industrial Tug-of-War, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1992, at 65.
75. )MIST REPORT, supra note 33, at 42.
76. See, e.g., Brussels Attacked Over Merger Policy, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 8,
1991, at 1 (the French and Italian criticism of then Commissioner for competition Sir
Leon Brittan and their response to the Commission's decision, to block the Franco-Itallan
takeover of Canadian aircraft manufacturer de Havilland and the French Transport
Minister's suggestion that the Merger Regulation should be modified to give industrial
considerations greater priority). The European Parliament has debated the relationship
between competition and other economic policies. See XXTH REPORT, supra note 31, at 253
(arguing that competition policy should be judged by reference to wider objectives of eco-
nomic and social cohesion and sustainable development); MXaST REPORT, supra note 33, at
218 (emphasizing its concern for the "need to strike a balance between competition policy
and the requirements of an industrial policy geared towards strengthening the Commu-
nity's productive structure and its international competitiveness, particularly in definable
strategic sectors").
77. The Commission's response to criticisms of its market-oriented approach is in-
structive:
The maintenance of effective competition is at the heart of the Commission's in-
dustrial strategy. Competition policy is an essential element of industrial policy
and the two do not conflict. Effective competition competition in the E.C. home
market is one of the prerequisites for wider international competitiveness
... [Tihe best way to improve competitiveness is through the application of
horizontal, efficiency-enhancing measures (e.g. general improvement of train-
ing, improved monetary stability to bring about a reduction in real interest
rates across the board. The Commission rejects sectoral or company-specific in-
tervention.
The creation of this market is in itself a powerful industrial policy since it gives
all industries a real chance to exploit economies of scope and scale to the full
and allows them to spread their R&D costs over a larger output, as well as pro-
viding the competitive stimulus to companies to innovate and invest in order to
exploit new market opportunities.
XXIST REPORT, supra note 33, at 223.
In December 1992, Sir Leon Brittan was moved to a new post as foreign minister for
economic affairs and was replaced as Commissioner for Competition by Karel van Mert.
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competitive process.78 Private capital bears the investment risk and,
with ideas subject to market pressure from a relatively early stage
in their development, there is less chance that resources will be
squandered unproductively than if projects were financed according
to a centrally conceived economic plan.79 The Commission has been
prepared to take the lead by allowing firms to exploit the potential
for structural change and the varied possibilities that their alliances
will create.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE JoINT VENTURES
The legal parameters for cooperative joint ventures in the E.C.
are defined in EEC Treaty Article 85.
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the com-
mon market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their ob-
ject or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the common market....
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article
shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however be declared inappli-
cable in the case of:
" any agreement or category of agreements between
undertakings;
" any decision or category of decisions by associations
of undertakings;
" any concerted practice or category of concerted prac-
tices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allow-
ing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, and which
does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminat-
78. See, e.g., Manfred Caspari, 1992 -EEC Competition Law and Industrial Policy, in
EEC/US COMPETrrION AND TRADE LAw 163, 179 (Barry Hawk ed., 1990); and Manfred
Caspari, Joint Ventures - The Intersection of Antitrust and Industrial Policy in the EEC,
in ANTrrRUST AND TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
449, 464 (Barry Hawk ed., 1986).
79. See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Acceptable Cooperation Among Competi-
tors in the Face of Growing International Competition, 58 ANTITRUST L. J. 529, 542 (1989)
(contrasting national planning which abolishes the market mechanism with "the pure,
private enterprise solution [of interfirm cooperation] which preserves market selection
but augments selection processes with private, bilateral, interfirm cooperation").
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ing competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products in question.
s8
As part of its supervisory responsibilities under the Treaty, the
Commission is authorized to enact Regulations8' implementing the
broad outlines of this Article. 2 Antitrust lawyers in the United
States will be familiar with the categories employed by the Com-
mission in its legal analysis. However, while its basic structure is
80. EEC TREATY, art. 85.
81. Regulations are general provisions of law enacted by the Council or the Commis-
sion pursuant to EEC TREATY, art. 189. Regulations are binding in their entirety on
Member States and "directly applicable," that is, they do not need to be transposed into
national law but take immediate effect upon enactment. The Commission has enacted a
variety of Regulations with respect to competition matters, commonly termed block ex-
emption or group exemption Regulations. The most important of these are:
* Commission Regulation 417/85 of 19 December 1984 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Specialization Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1
[hereinafter Commission Regulation on Specialization Agreements];
" Commission Regulation 418/85 on the Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Research and Development Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5
[hereinafter Commission Regulation on Research and Development Agreements];
" Commission Regulation 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1984
O.J. (L 219) 15, corrected by 1985 O.J. (L 280) 32 [hereinafter Commission Regu-
lation on Patent Licensing Agreements];
* Commission Regulation 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing Agreements,
1989 O.J. CL 61) 1 [hereinafter Commission Regulation on Know-how Licensing
Agreements].
The scope of these Regulations has subsequently been extended by Commission Regula-
tion 151/93 of 23 December 1992 amending Regulations 417/85, 418/85, 2349/84 and
556/89 on Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Specialization
Agreements, Patent Licensing Agreements and Know-how Licensing Agreements, 1993
O.J. (L21) 8 [hereinafter Amendment Regulation].
82. The extent of the Commission's competence in competition matters is defined in
Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 5. This Regulation outlines procedures for the
resolution of competition issues and grants the Commission broad investigatory and ad-
judicatory powers. Actions taken by the Commission pursuant to this authority are sub-
ject to review only by the Court of Justice. The Commission has expounded the proce-
dural framework for interpreting various classes of cooperation agreement in Commission
Regulation 27/62, First Regulation implementing Council Regulation 17 of 6 February
1962, Amended by Regulation 1133/68 of 26 July 1968, by Regulation 1699/75 of 2 July
1975 and by Regulation 2526/85 of 5 August 1985 (Form, content and other details con-
cerning applications and notifications), 1985 O.J. (L 249) 11 [hereinafter Commission
Regulation 27/62]. While ultimate jurisdiction in competition matters under E.C. law re-
sides with the Court of Justice, Commission Decisions must be appealed initially to the
Court of First Instance. The Court of First Instance was attached to the Court of Justice
in October 1988 in order to alleviate that Court's increasing case load. About half of its
work, however, relates to competition cases. See Bo Vesterdorf, The Court of First In-
stance of the European Communities After Two Full Years in Operation, 29 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 897, 898 (1992). Decisions of the Court of First Instance may be appealed to the
Court of Justice on points of law only.
COOPERATIVE JOINT VENTURES
similar to that of the United States,' its regulatory framework is
vastly different. This part presents the legal analysis in a practical
structure highlighting the competition issues raised when a U.S.
firm contemplates a joint venture with a partner in the E.C.
A. The Relationship Between E. C. and National Competition Laws
The national courts of Member States have a duty to protect
the rights conferred upon individuals and companies by E.C. com-
petition law." National competition law, however, is still properly
applied within its own sphere. Thus, adjudication of competition is-
sues mirrors the quasi-federal character of E.C. government insti-
tutions by raising questions concerning the conflict of laws, the ju-
risdiction of the courts of Member States and the source of remedies.
While these questions are not unique to the application of E.C. com-
petition law, they are obviously central to the legal evaluation of
U.S.-E.C. joint ventures.
1. Conflict of Laws. It is established that E.C. competition law
preempts conflicting provisions of the competition law of individual
Member States. In Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt,s5
the Court of Justice, while allowing in principle that national com-
petition authorities may take action with respect to situations likely
to be the subject of a decision by the Commission, held that the
parallel application of national competition law is permitted only in-
sofar as "it does not prejudice the uniform application throughout
the Common Market of the Community law on cartels.""6 Accord-
ingly, in cases of conflict, Community law takes precedence. 7
83. Essentially, anticompetitive agreements are prohibited by Article 85(1) but may
be exempted under Article 85(3) either by way of a group exemption Regulation or indi-
vidual decision. EEC TREATY art. 85(1)(3).
84. This obligation is termed the principle of "direct effect." See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van
Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12
("Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law... not only imposes
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become
part of their legal heritage."). Accordingly, individuals and corporations may sue for en-
forcement of E.C. competition law in national courts. See Case 12/73 BRT v. SABAM,
1974 E.C.R. 51, 62 ("As the prohibition of Articles 85(1) and 86 tend by their very nature
to produce direct effects in relations between individuals, these Articles create direct
rights in respect of the individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard.").
85. Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1.
86. Id. at 14.
87. Id.
The EEC Treaty has established its own system of law, integrated into the legal
systems of the Member States, and which must be applied by their courts...
Consequently, conflicts between the rules of the Community and national rules
in the matter of the law on cartels must be resolved by applying the principle
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*While easy to state in theory, the application of the preemption
principle is disputed in practice and there is debate with respect to
what constitutes a conflict between E.C. and national competition
law. There is no conflict if, for any of the reasons discussed in Part
H(C), Article 85(1) does not apply to a joint venture. Because Com-
munity law is inapplicable, national law may be applied without the
possibility of conflict. Similarly, if a joint venture violates Article
85(1), it cannot be permitted under a provision of national law be-
cause such a decision would conflict with Article 85(2).
Difficulties arise when an agreement that is exempted under
Community law pursuant to a Group Exemption Regulation 88 or in-
dividual decision 9 would violate a provision of national law. Under
the majority view, the prohibition by national law of an agreement
exempted under E.C. competition law would conflict with the prin-
ciple of the supremacy of Community law." This conclusion, it is
maintained, follows logically from the authority granted to the
Commission "to carry out certain positive, though indirect, action
with a view to promoting a harmonious development of economic
activities within the whole Community."9' An important minority
has argued, on the other hand, that this interpretation illegitimately
extends the holding of Walt Wilhelm and is based on an erroneous
understanding of the term "positive action." Group exemptions and,
according to some, even individual exemptions, do not constitute
"positive action" and therefore fall outside the scope of the preemp-
tion principle.9 2 The minority also points out that the majority posi-
tion allows minor Community interests to take precedence over im-
portant national interests. For both these reasons, it maintains that
an agreement must be legal under both E.C. and national law in or-
der to be valid.
As a practical matter, one can assume that national competi-
tion law is applicable to joint venture agreements that, for the rea-
sons mentioned in part 11(C), are not prohibited by Article 85(1).
Even at this stage in the development of the single market, however,
it is not possible to predict with certainty whether a national com-
petition authority would seek to prohibit a joint venture that had
been exempted under Community law pursuant to an Article 85(3)
that Community law takes precedence.
Id.
88. See supra note 81; infra text accompanying notes 151-163.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 164-186.
90. This view is espoused by the Commission. See infra note 106.
91. Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm and others v. Bundeskartellant, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 14.
92. See Kurt Stockmann, EEC Competition Law and Member State Competition
Laws, in NORTH AmERICAN AND COMMON MARKET ANTrrRUST AND TRADE LAWs 265, 290
nn.72-95 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988).
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exemption. Potential conflicts are most likely to emerge in those
countries that traditionally have been most protective of their own
rights as enforcers of competition law, such as the United Kingdom
and Germany.93 Despite the potential availability of a group exemp-
tion, the parents of joint ventures with significant effects in these
countries would be advised to consult at an early stage in their ne-
gotiations with the appropriate national authorities.
4
2. Spheres of Competence. Although national courts are bound
to apply E.C. competition law,95 they do not have authority to apply
all the provisions in Article 85. Their competence is limited to the
power to void agreements in violation of the prohibition against an-
ticompetitive agreements in Article 85(1) and to grant exemptions
from the prohibition pursuant to the narrow conditions defined in
the Group Exemption Regulations' enacted by the CommissionY
They are not authorized, however, to grant exemptions by way of
individual decision under Article 85(3).98 The power of exemption by
individual decision remains the exclusive province of the Commis-
sion.99
The rationale for this limitation is the need to ensure the con-
sistent and uniform application of E.C. competition laws throughout
the Community. As a political-legislative body, the Commission is
better placed than the judiciary of a single Member State to make
the type of value judgments that potentially inform individual deci-
sions under Article 85(3).lo0 If national courts were authorized to ex-
empt joint ventures on an individual basis, there would be a danger
93. See, e.g., UKAgency Chief Advocates Improvements Among E.C. Commission and
National Officials, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1590, at 605 (Nov. 12, 1992)
(warning that Commission exemptions "reflect a Community average position, whereas
different arrangements may be appropriate for different countries, taking account of na-
tional circumstances"). See also Otfried Lieberknecht, United States Companies in For-
eign Joint Ventures, 54 ANTrrRUST L. J. 1051, 1069-71 (1985) (noting that the German
federal cartel office claims the right to prohibit the formation of ajoint venture which has
been the subject of an exemption under Article 85(3)).
94. This issue has become more important since the extension of the group
exemption Regulations. See Amendment Regulation, supra note 81.
95. See supra note 84.
96. See supra note 81.
97. Case 234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, 1991 E.C.R.1 935, 991.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. See also Helmuth R.B. Schroter, Antitrust Ananlysis Under Article 85(1) and
(3), in NORTH AtmERICAN AND COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST AND TRADE LAWS 645, 663
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988) ("The underlying idea is that decisions which necessarily imply
complex evaluations of economic matters and which, moreover, may have far-reaching
consequences in the whole Common Market ought to be taken by the competent political
body and not left to the lower courts of the Member States.").
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that different courts would evaluate the issues under conflicting
principles of economics and social policy thereby undermining the
uniformity of competition law and encouraging forum shopping.10'
3. Remedies. The Commission may impose fines for violations of
E.C. competition law.102 It cannot, however, award compensation to a
private party for loss incurred due to a violation.10 3 Further, al-
though E.C. competition law must be applied in the courts of Mem-
ber States under the principle of "direct effect,"1°4 the rules provide
no new private remedies for competition violations. To grant mean-
ingful relief to a private litigant, national courts are directed to
101. See E.C. Commissioner Sketches Future Use of Competition Policy and Enforce.
ment, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1594, at 737 (Dec. 10, 1992) (remarks by
then Commissioner of Competition, Sir Leon Brittan who expressed a desire to involve
national courts more directly in the implementation of E.C. competition law but reiter-
ated that they would not be allowed to grant individual exemptions from the prohibition
against anticompetitive agreements contained in Article 85(1) because of the need to pre-
vent the divergent application of E.C. law in different Member States and the subsequent
danger of forum shopping).
The Commission has recently published a draft notice of guidelines to assist national
courts in applying E.C. competition law. Draft Notice of the Commission on the Applica-
tion of the EEC Competition Rules by National Courts, reprinted in BERNARD VAN DE
WALLE DE GHELCKE & GERWIN VAN GERVEN, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMM5UN1TY, Appendix 130 (Julian 0. von Kalinowski ed., 1992) [hereinafter
Draft Notice on the Application of the EEC Competition Rules]. These guidelines articu-
late several simple principles. First, a national court must determine whether an agree-
ment violates the prohibition of Article 85(1). If it does not violate the prohibition, then
the court may determine the legality of the agreement under the applicable national law.
Second, if the agreement does violate the prohibition, the court must determine whether
it meets the conditions of a group exemption Regulation. If the agreement meets these
conditions, it is exempted from the prohibition because, under the principle of "direct ef-
fect." See supra note 84. The Regulations "create rights for individuals and companies
which national courts must enforce." Draft Notice on the Application of the EEC Compe-
tition Rules, at 130-3. Third, if the agreement does not fall within a group exemption but
the parties have notified the Commission of their agreement, the court should use Com-
mission precedent to evaluate the probability of an individual exemption under Article
85(3). As a result of this evaluation, a national court may (a) determine that an individual
exemption is unlikely in which case it should void the agreement; (b) determine that an
individual exemption is likely and either treat the agreement as valid or suspend proceed-
ings to avoid potential conflict with a later decision of the Commission; or (c) determine
that the outcome is uncertain and either void the agreement or suspend proceedings
pending a final decision of the Commission. Id. at 130-3-4.
102. See Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 5, art. 15(2) (providing for fines "from
1,000 to 1,000,000 units of account, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10% of
the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in
the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently: (a) they infringe Article 85(1)
or Article 86 of the Treaty.").
103. Draft Notice on the Application of the EEC Competition Rules, supra note 101,
at 130-7.
104. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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provide remedies for a breach of Community competition law on the
same conditions as would be available if the breach were a violation
of national competition law. 5
B. Preliminary Considerations: The Relevant Market
At several stages in its analysis, the Commission uses a
bright-line market share test to determine the appropriate treat-
ment of a joint venture. Thus, if the partners are to be certain of the
substantive and procedural law governing their agreement, it is es-
sential that the relevant market be defined correctly. The question
of relevant market definition has two components: the product mar-
ket and the geographic market.
1. The Product Market. The Commission has rejected the notion
that the relevant market is comprised merely of the class of identical
goods and has adopted a functional analysis that classifies products
on the basis of their suitability for the performance of certain tasks.
"A relevant product market comprises in particular all those prod-
ucts which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the
consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics their prices and
their intended use."0 6 Application of the test depends on factors
which can be inferred only from a consideration of consumer expec-
tations and the other products available to them, in other words, the
cross-elasticity of supply and demand in the market.07 A separate
product market will be found when, in terms of price, product char-
acteristics or intended use, there is "lack of sufficient substitutabil-
ity between the products concerned." 10 8 Supply and demand-side
105. Case 158/80 Rewe v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, 1981 E.C.R. 1805, See also Draft Notice
on the Application of the EEC Competition Rules, supra note 101, at 130-2. As a practical
matter, while permitting individuals and companies to complain directly to the Commis-
sion concerning violations of the competition rules, the Commission encourages proceed-
ings in national courts. National courts may permit a plaintiff to combine claims under
both national and E.C. law and are in a better position to grant more effective interim re-
lief. In some cases, they may award attorney fees. Id. at 130-2. In addition, the Commis-
sion has stated that it "will concentrate its activities on those cases which in the light of
the Community's overall objectives laid down in the EEC Treaty require priority or oth-
erwise have an important Community interest." Id.
106. XXIST REPORT, supra note 33 at 357.
107. Id. The "reasonable interchangeability" test and associated concepts of
cross-elasticity of supply and demand are commonly used in U.S. antitrust analysis. See,
e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
108. XIST REPORT, supra note 33, at 357. Compare Optical Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L 236)
30, 40 (holding that effective competition in the E.C. market for optical fibers would be
maintained by, among other factors, non-E.C. producers who could readily export to the
E.C. and other traditional technologies such as cables and microwave and satellite
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substitutability, moreover, must be evaluated on the basis of com-
petition that can be brought about "in the near future and not only
be based on a medium or long-term change in demand or supply."10 9
2. The Geographic Market. A geographic market is an area in
which firms are in competition with one another and the conditions
of competition are similar for all firms. 0 Ideally, when the econo-
mies of Member States are fully integrated, the relevant market for
most industrial products and services will, in most instances, com-
prise the entire Community."' As a practical matter, however, the
Commission at the present time must first establish that the condi-
tions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous in different parts
of the Community as to justify their inclusion in the same market.12
A distinct geographic market is most likely to be found whenever
conditions of competition are distorted by artificial or high barriers
to entry" 3 or where transport costs comprise a high proportion of the
cost of the finished product." 4 In these cases, the relevant market is
transmission techniques) and BBC Brown Boveri, 1988 O.J. (L 301) 68, 72 (holding that
effective competition in the market for electric car high-performance batteries would be
maintained by competition with conventional vehicles) with Tetra Pak/Alfa Laval, O.J.
1991 (L 290) 35 (separate product markets found for aseptic packaging machines using
carton and aseptic or non-aseptic packaging machines using glass or plastic where in-
quiry revealed low demand elasticity due to difficulty for customers to switch from one
product to another)..
The substitution test conforms with the intent of E.C. competition law which re-
quires not perfect but workable competition, namely, that degree of competition which is
essential to ensure the attainment of objectives set by the Treaty of Rome without elimi-
nating competition in a substantial part of the common market. Case 226/76, Metro
SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co, KG v. Commission of the European Communities, 1977
E.C.R. 1875, 1904. The goal of the Commission's competition policy is satisfied by a
showing that there are available realistic alternative sources of consumer satisfaction.
See infra notes 178-183 and accompanying text.
109. XXIST REPORT, supra note 33, at 357.
110. Id. at 254.
111. Id. at 43 ("As a result of the abolition of barriers brought about by the comple-
tion of the internal market, it is clear that reference markets have a tendency to become
wider.").
112. Id. at 358. Indicia of an integrated market and homogeneous conditions of com-
petition include absence of price differences, presence of major suppliers in all Member
States, substantial cross-border trade and imports, low transport costs and lack of strong
national buying preferences.
113. Id. at 361. Indicia of discrete national markets include national suppliers with
high market shares, import tariffs, national specification requirements, cultural barriers,
public purchasers with national buying preferences.
114. See Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 59, at II 14.
The relevant geographical market will be narrower than the whole common
market in particular where:
the nature and characteristics of the contract product, e.g. high transport costs
in relation to the value of the product, restrict its mobility; or movement of the
COOPERATIVE JOINT VENTURES
the geographic segment of the Community within which the excep-
tional conditions obtain." 5
C. Analyzing Cooperative Joint Ventures Under Article 85
After the relevant market has been defined, the analysis pro-
ceeds in a series of steps dictated by the market share of the part-
ners and the categorization of their agreement. First, one must es-
tablish whether or not the joint venture falls within the terms of the
general prohibition against anticompetitive agreements contained in
Article 85(1). Second, if the joint venture does fall within the terms
of this general prohibition, one must categorize the agreement and
ask whether or not it is entitled to an automatic exemption under a
relevant group exemption Regulation.16 Third, if the joint venture is
not entitled to an automatic exemption, one must consider whether
or not it may be exempted from the prohibition by means of an indi-
vidual decision. And fourth, all joint ventures must be analyzed to
ensure that any anticompetitive restriction between the parents is
proportionate to the legitimate objectives of their agreement.
1. The Applicability of Article 85(1). The threshold question is
whether a joint venture is prohibited by Article 85(1) because it dis-
torts trade between Member States. Article 85(1) may be held not to
apply to a joint venture for one or more of four reasons. First, the
actual or foreseeable effects of the joint venture are confined within
the territory of one Member State or within territories outside the
Community." 7 Second, the joint venture is "neutral to competition
contract product within the common market is hindered by barriers to entry to
national markets resulting from State intervention, such as quantitative re-
strictions, severe taxation differentials and non-tariff barriers, e.g. type ap-
provals or safety standard certifications. In such cases the national territory
may have to be considered as the relevant geographical market. However, this
will only be justified if the existing barriers to entry cannot be overcome by rea-
sonable effort and at an acceptable cost.
Id.
115. See, e.g., Alcatel/Telettra, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 48 (holding Spanish transmission
equipment market constituted separate market because vertical links between the State
telecommunications operator and its equipment suppliers created barrier to entry to po-
tential foreign competitors) and Fiat/Ford, 1991 O.J. (C 34) (holding Italian market for
agricultural equipment constituted separate market because of Fiat's market power
through exclusive purchasing agreement with a national buying organization). Although
the Commission's focus is on markets within the Community, it has found on occasion
that the relevant geographic market is, in fact, world-wide. In these circumstances, its
evaluation of a product market reflects competitive pressures which exist globally. See,
e.g., AerospatialelMBB, 1991 O.J. (C 59) 13.
116. See supra note 81.
117. See Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 4. This factor will
apply only to joint ventures between small parent companies with insignificant market
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within the meaning of the 1968 Notice on cooperation between en-
terprises."11" Third, the parent companies are non-competitors and
their joint venture does not significantly affect the market access of
third parties"9 or belong to a network of joint ventures created by
one of the parents." And fourth, the joint venture meets the de
minimis exception for "agreements of minor importance."12' If, for
any of these reasons, the joint venture does not fall within the pro-
hibition of Article 85(1), E.C. competition law does not apply to the
agreement.m In this event, the legality of the joint venture may be
determined under the law of the Member State in which it is
applied.
a. The 1968 Notice.' Under the principles of the 1968 Notice, a
joint venture is not prohibited by Article 85(1) if its activities are
neutral with respect to competition. There are basically four types of
joint ventures in this category.3 First, those "which perform certain
internal organizational tasks on behalf of their parent companies"
such as joint market research, joint debt-collecting and joint storage
facilities for transport equipment; second, those which arrange co-
operation in fields away from the market, for example, in research
and development; 6 third, those between non-competing firms de-
signed to provide joint-selling, after-sales or repair service; 127 and
fourth, those which, without impeding competition, permit the par-
ent companies to pool their resources in fields such as advertising or
shares and will not, therefore, be discussed in detail in this article. See Draft Notice on
Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 10 ("Trade between Member States is likely
to be appreciably affected only when the thresholds referred to in the Notice on agree-
ments of minor importance are exceeded."). See also infra text accompanying notes
140-147.
118. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 4.
119. Id. at 7.
120. Id. at 6.
121. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 59.
122. The parents of a joint venture that falls outside the prohibition against anti-
competitive agreements contained in Article 85(1) are not required to satisfy the notifica-
tion requirements of Council Regulation 17/62. Indeed, there is not even a need to seek an
exemption from the prohibition under Article 85(3). Council Regulation 17/62 supra note
5, art. 4 provides that "agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the kind de-
scribed in Article 85(1) of the Treaty ... in respect of which the parties seek application of
Article 85(3) must be notified to the Commission. Until they have been notified, no deci-
sion in application of Article 851] may be taken."
123. See supra note 38. The contents of the 1968 Notice were reaffirmed in the recent
Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note
14, at 4.
124. See Draft Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 8-9.
125. 1968 Notice, supra note 38, at 1-2.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Draft Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 8.
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the use of a common quality label.m The precise scope of these pro-
visions is unclear but, in any event, they must be construed nar-
rowly. The joint venture will not be deemed neutral with respect to
competition if it affects the independent business decisions of the
parent companies,' restricts competition between them130 or alters
the market position of third parties."1
b. Joint Ventures Between Non-Competitors. Article 85(1) will
not prohibit a joint venture if the parent companies are neither ac-
tual nor potential competitors and its creation does not significantly
affect the market position of third parties. 12 The question of
whether partners in a joint venture are actual competitors is rela-
tively straightforward. One simply determines the relevant market
under the analysis used in Part H(B) and asks whether the partners
are competing for a share of that market. This analysis would apply
to a joint venture involving a U.S. corporation that was already
competing through its exports to the Community even though it did
not have a direct presence there. The question of whether partners
are potential competitors is more complex. In these cases, the Com-
mission requires a realistic appraisal of the likelihood that both
partners could participate in the market individually. The applica-
tion of the criteria used to make this determination will vary accord-
128. Id. at 9.
129. This conclusion may fairly be inferred from the statement that the 1968 Notice
applies where "the effect on the business decisions of the parent companies and, hence, on
competition, is nil." Draft Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 8.
130. For example, the Commission argues that "joint ventures which deal solely with
research and development do not, generally speaking, restrict competition, even where
their parents compete with each other." Id. at 8. While this assertion might be chal-
lenged, it is nevertheless clear that the 1968 Notice will not apply "if the enterprises en-
ter into commitments which restrict their own research and development activity or the
utilization of the results of joint work so that they do not have a free hand with regard to
their own research and development outside the joint projects." 1968 Notice, supra note
38, art. 3.
131. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 4.
132. On occasion, the Commission indicates that it may be unnecessary to analyze
the effects of a joint venture between non-competitors on third parties. See, e.g., Draft
Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 4 ("There is no restriction of co-
mpetition if the joint venture operates outside the actual or potential fields of activity of
the parent companies; its establishment therefore has only a positive effect, since it cre-
ates a new competitor."). Elsewhere, however, it is clear that this step is an essential part
of the inquiry. See, e.g., Elopak/Metal Box - Odin, 1990 O.J. (L 209) 15, 21-22 (holding
that Article 85(1) did not apply to the joint venture because neither parent "could have
realistically developed the new product without the full and active participation of its
partner" and the creation of the joint venture was "not likely to lead to foreclosure of
similar possibilities to potential competitors"). See also Notice on Cooperative Joint Ven-
tures, supra note 14, at 7 ("[O]ne must examine whether market access of third parties is
significantly affected by the cooperation between the parents.").
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ing to circumstances. 133
The fact that a U.S. firm currently makes no sales in the Com-
munity does not establish, without more, that a potential competi-
tive relationship does not exist with a prospective E.C. partner. The
firm may have the resources to enter the market alone but, for a va-
riety of reasons, has chosen not to do so. In some circumstances, the
realistic threat of its entry may be exerting influence on the policies
of those companies actually in the market. The Commission is likely
to reach this conclusion, however, only if the threat of entry is
"sufficiently intense" as to restrict the ability of firms in the E.C. to
act independently of any market pressure exerted by the potential
competitor.3 4
A joint venture between parent companies that are neither ac-
tual nor potential competitors will not be prohibited under Article
85(1) unless "the market access of third parties is significantly af-
fected by the cooperation between the parents" 1 5 or unless "it be-
longs to a network of joint ventures set up by one of the parents for
the same product market with different partners. 36 For example, if
the parents are companies with strong market positions and operate
up or downstream of their joint venture, their cooperation has the
potential for serious adverse effects on former customers and suppli-
133. The following questions may be relevant:
Does each parent company have sufficient financial resources, managerial qualifica-
tions and access to input products to carry out the planned investment? Does each parent
know the production technique? Does each parent make the upstream or downstream
product himself and does it have access to the necessary production facilities? Is actual or
potential demand such as to enable each parent company to manufacture the product on
its own? Does each parent company have access to the distribution channels needed to
sell the product manufactured by the JV? Can each parent company on its own bear the
technical and financial risk associated with the production operations of the JV? What is
the relevant geographic and poduct market? What are the barriers to entry into that
market? Is each parent company capable of entering that market alone? Can each parent
overcome existing barriers within a reasonable time and without undue effort or cost?
The parents of a joint venture are potential competitors, in so far as in the light of
the above factors, which may be given different weight from case to case, they could rea-
sonably be expected to act autonomously.
Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 5.
134. XXIST REPORT, supra note 33, at 365.
135. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 7. The Notice States
that:
The appraisal of a cooperative joint venture in the light of the competition rules
will focus on the relationship between the enterprises concerned and on the ef-
fects of their cooperation on third parties... [Ilt is necessary to examine
whether the operation in question is likely to affect appreciably the competitive
position of third parties, especially with regard to supply and sales possibilities.
Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 6.
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ers.13 7 Likewise, a network of joint ventures, even though between
parents who are non-competitors, may distort or restrict competition
because one of the parent companies has the ability to coordinate
the competitive behavior of all the joint ventures.13 As a rule, joint
ventures between non-competitors will not fall within Article 85(1) if
there are sufficient alternative sources of supply and demand for the
product outside of the joint venture.'39 Where a network of joint
ventures is involved, on the other hand, it is less likely that any of
them will be found to fall outside the prohibition.
c. De Minimis Effects. Although not explicitly stated in Article
85(1), the Commission has adopted the view that "only those agree-
ments are prohibited which have an appreciable impact on market
conditions, in that they appreciably alter the market position, in
other words the sales or supply possibilities, of third undertakings
and of users." 40 Accordingly, even if the parent companies are actual
or potential competitors, the foregoing analysis requires a determi-
nation of whether the venture falls within a de minimis safe har-
bor.'4 '
The Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance provides that a
joint venture will be deemed not to have an appreciable effect on
competition if two conditions are satisfied. First, the products that
are the subject of the agreement must "not represent more than 5%
of the total market for such goods or services in the area of the com-
mon market affected by the agreement."42 Second, "the aggregate
annual turnover of the participating undertakings [must] not exceed
E.C.U. 200 million."'
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id. See also Optical Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L 236) 30, 37.
139. Id. See also Elopak/Metal Box, 1990 O.J. (L 209) 15, 19 ("As the parties could
not realistically be regarded as competitors, actual or potential, and the creation of the
joint venture entails no foreclosure risk, and the agreement does not involve the creation
of a network of competing joint ventures, the agreements to establish Odin do not fall
within the terms of Article 85(1)."). See also Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra
note 14, at 6 (noting that the risk of foreclosure increases "in step with the degree of oli-
gopolization of the market and the existence of exclusive or preferential links between the
joint venture and its parents").
140. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 59 at 2.
141. The criteria for determining an "appreciable effect" under the de minimis ex-
ception of this Notice are different from those criteria used to determine whether, in a
joint venture between non-competitors, market access is foreclosed. The test of
"significance" in the latter case requires a showing of market power. Because the Notice
on Agreements of Minor Importance also applies to competitors, the thresholds of
"appreciable effect" are much more stringent.
142. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 59at 7.
143. Id. At a conversion rate of $1.18 per E.C.U., the turnover threshold is approxi-
mately $169 million. For the purposes of determining total sales, the calculation must in-
clude sales not only of the parent companies but also the sales of all subsidiary companies
1993] 1021
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The first criterion can be readily applied to all joint ventures
whether involving only E.C. partners or non-E.C. partners using the
principles outlined in the preceding section. However, the second
condition presents a question of equity as applied to a joint venture
involving a parent which is a U.S. corporation. Literally read, the
provision suggests that, irrespective of where they are made, all
sales of the parent corporation should be included in the calculations
of the aggregate annual turnover. While such a standard is a legiti-
mate measure of market power in the E.C. it does not accurately
measure the E.C. market power of a joint venture involving a U.S.
corporation whose sales are largely made outside of the E.C. Argu-
ably, the domestic sales of a U.S. corporation should not be included
in the second prong of the de minimis test.
Support for this approach may be found in the Merger Regula-
tion's discussion of the jurisdictional thresholds for the application
of the Regulation to mergers or concentrations "with a Community
dimension."'" The Council has specified that the Regulation applies
only if, inter alia, "the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each
of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than E.C.U.
250 million."145 Thus, without regard to the magnitude of sales else-
where, sales made in the Community are determinative of the issue
of whether a Community dimension exists. Similarly, sales made by
a U.S. corporation in the United States do not necessarily indicate
that a joint venture involving that corporation will have more than a
negligible impact on competition within the Community.
The Commission has stated that its quantitative definition of
"appreciable" is "no absolute yardstick."146 Agreements exceeding the
thresholds "may still have only a negligible effect on trade between
Member States or on competition, and are therefore not caught by
Article 85(1). "147 Hence, notwithstanding sales in excess of the E.C.U
250 million threshold, a U.S.-E.C. joint venture could take advan-
tage of the de minimis exception if, despite the volume of their com-
bined sales, their joint venture would have only a negligible impact
on competition in the E.C.
2. Automatic Exemption From Article 85(1). If a joint venture is
prohibited by Article 85(1), Council Regulation 17/62 provides that
the parents may notify the Commission of their agreement and seek
an exemption from the prohibition under Article 85(3).148 Moreover,
within the group of which the parent company is a member. Id. at 9(a)-(d).
144. Control of Concentrations Regulation, supra note 19, art. 1(2).
145. Id. art. 1(1).
146. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 59, at 3.
147. Id.
148. See supra note 147. Whereas applications for negative clearance presuppose
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the Commission has created a number of block exemptions 14 9. which
automatically exempt certain categories of agreements deemed to
raise minimal problems from a competition standpoint. Parents of
joint ventures that meet the criteria set out in these Regulations are
not required to notify the Commission of the agreement in order to
qualify for an exemption. 50 The most relevant block exemptions con-
cern specialization and joint research and development agreements.
a. Specialization Joint Ventures.' The Regulation on Speciali-
zation Agreements applies to joint ventures in which the parents
combine their resources to manufacture certain products.'52 To
qualify for an exemption under this Regulation, two tests must be
met. First, the products that are the subject of the agreement must
"not represent more than 20% of the market for such products in the
common market or a substantial part thereof." Second, the parents'
combined annual sales must not exceed E.C.U. 1 billion. 5 3
The original version of the Specialization Agreement Regula-
tion restricted the application of the exemption to joint ventures in-
volving only production and did not excuse undertakings involving
that Article 851) does not apply to the joint venture, notification is required when Article
85(1) does apply and the partners are seeking an exemption from the prohibition.
149. Supra note 81.
150. See, e.g., Commission Regulation on Specialization Agreements, supra note 81,
Preamble (9) and Commission Regulation on Research and Development Agreements, su-
pra note 81, Preamble (18).
151. Commission Regulation on Specialization Agreements, supra note 81.
152. Id. art. 2.
153. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 9. The sales threshold
contained in the original Regulation was E.C.U. 500 million. The second condition raises
the same question as the Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, namely, whether in
the case of foreign firms the sales threshold is calculated exclusively of sales outside the
E.C. See supra text accompanying notes 143-147. In this case, however, the Commission
has stated that the block exemption may be applicable to a joint venture exceeding the
sales threshold provided that it is "properly notified [to the Commission in accordance
with the provisions of Commission Regulation No 27/62] and that the Commission does
not object to the agreement within six months." Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures,
supra note 14, at 9. By allowing the partners an opportunity to demonstrate that their
venture would not threaten competition, this "opposition procedure" preserves the pos-
sibility that a joint venture with a U.S. parent may qualify for an automatic exemption
notwithstanding sales by the joint venture in excess of the E.C.U. 1 billion threshold. This
procedure, however, is not available if the market share threshold is exceeded. Id.
The notification procedures of Commission Regulation 27/62 specifically require dis-
cussion of the sales of each partner in the relevant market:
The sales or turnover of each party in the goods or services affected by the ar-
rangements in the Community and worldwide. If the turnover in the Commu-
nity is material (say more than a 5% market share), please also give figures for
each Member State, and for previous years (in order to show significant trends),
and give each party's sales targets for the future. Provide the same figures for
any relevant associated company.
Commission Regulation 27/62, supra note 82, Complementary Note IX 3.3.
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the products and did not excuse undertakings involving the market-
ing or distribution of products. In the amended regulation, however,
the Commission extends the exemption to cover joint marketing and
distribution arrangements subject to the restriction that the ven-
ture's combined market share not exceed 10%.1 4 In practice, this
means that a specialization joint venture will be automatically ex-
empted by the Commission from the prohibition of Article 85(1) if
either, in the case of a production joint venture only, the parent
companies controlled a maximum of 20% of the relevant market and
their combined sales did not exceed E.C.U. 1 billion or, if the joint
venture included distribution, the parents controlled a maximum of
10% of the relevant market and their combined sales did not exceed
E.C.U. 1 billion.
b. Research and Development Joint Ventures.5 ' The Commis-
sion Regulation on Research and Development Agreements applies
to "joint research and development of products or processes and joint
exploitation 5 ' of the results of that research and development." 1
The phrase "research and development of products or processes" is
narrowly construed as the acquisition of "technical knowledge which
is either protected by an intellectual property right or is secret
know-how."' This definition sets a high standard for the type of
agreement that can be exempted under the Regulation.
While the Regulation on Research and Development does not
154. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 9 and Discussion Paper,
supra note 14, at 3.
155. Commission Regulation on Research and Development, supra note 81. The re-
search and development activities to which this Regulation is addressed must not be con-
fused with the research and development activities mentioned in the 1968 Notice dis-
cussed in the text in part II(C)(1)(a), and which are considered to be neutral in their im-
pact on competition so that Article 85(1) does not apply. Supra text accompanying notes
123-131. Article 85(1) applies to the joint ventures addressed here because (i) they include
the stage of industrial application and (ii) the parents agree to restrict their competitive
freedom and "forego the opportunity of gaining competitive advantage over the other
parties." Id. Preamble (2). See, e.g., Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14,
at 10.
By the allocation of contract territories the parents can protect themselves for
the duration of the contract from the manufacture and use of the contract prod-
ucts by other partners in the reserved territories; furthermore, they can prevent
other partners from pursuing an active marketing policy in those territories for
five years after the introduction of the new or improved product into the com-
mon market.
156. Joint exploitation is "the manufacture of new or improved products as well as
the use of new or improved production processes, the marketing of products derived from
R&D activities and the granting of manufacturing, use or distribution licenses to third
parties." Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 10.
157. Commission Regulation on Research and Development, supra note 81, art.
1(1)(a).
158. Id. art. 1(2)(e).
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set a sales threshold for exemption, it does impose a definite market
share limit.5 9 If both partners manufacture products that are capa-
ble of being replaced or improved by the product that is the subject
of the joint research and development, the exemption will only apply
if "the parties' combined production of the products capable of being
improved or replaced by the contract products does not exceed 20%
of the market for such products in the common market or a sub-
stantial part thereof.""
If realized, the exemption applies for the duration of the re-
search program and, if the results of the research are jointly ex-
ploited,'6 ' for an additional period of five years from the time when
the products are first marketed in the Community. Thereafter, the
exemption will be extended for as long as the parents' combined
market share for the product of the joint research does not exceed
20%.162
The original Regulation did not permit the joint venture to
distribute or market the product that was the subject of its research
and development activities. The new Notice on Cooperative Joint
Ventures, however, extended its scope to include distribution ar-
rangements so long as the market share of the venture and the par-
ent companies does not exceed 10%.'0
3. Exemption by Individual Decision.' 4 If a joint venture is not
entitled to an automatic exemption, the parents can notify the Com-
mission of their agreement pursuant to Council Regulation 17/62
and seek an exemption by way of individual decision. An exemption
will be granted under this provision only if the joint venture satis-
fies the four conditions of Article 85(3)." 5 The degree of scrutiny to
which the Commission will subject joint ventures seeking exemp-
tions by individual decision depends on the threat to competition
posed by the particular circumstances of each case. There are some
joint ventures that may be granted "almost automatic eligibility for
exemption."166 On the other hand, the "major cases (in terms of the
economic and financial power and market share of the firms con-
159. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 10.
160. Commission Regulation on Research and Development, supra note 81, art. 3(2).
161. Supra note 159.
162. Commission Regulation on Research and Development, supra note 81, art. 3(3).
163. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 10 and Draft Notice on
Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 3.
164. The power of exemption by individual decision is within the exclusive compe-
tence of the Commission. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
165. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 10 and Draft Notice on
Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14 at 17.
166. Discussion Paper, supra note 14, at 3.
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cerned) will always require a detailed individual scrutiny which en-
ables their objective advantages to be weighed up against the result-
ing adverse effects on competition." 67 Indeed, under any circum-
stances, the parties must establish that the joint venture "entails
objective advantages which offset the risks which its establishment
and operation pose to competition.""
a. Almost Automatic Eligibility for Exemption. According to the
Draft Notice, there are circumstances under which an agreement
will be granted "almost automatic eligibility" for exemption under
Article 85(3). The language "almost automatic eligibility for exemp-
tion" means, in effect, that certain agreements will be given
"sympathetic consideration."'69 This term clearly implies less than
the most rigorous degree of scrutiny.
To be entitled to "sympathetic consideration," the parties must,
at a minimum, present a plausible business justification for their
agreement. They must establish that the joint venture entails some
objective advantage that could not come about but for the agree-
ment. The Commission has stated that "sympathetic consideration"
could be given, for example, to joint ventures that "create substan-
tial capacity or which significantly increase their parents' existing
capacity." 70 More generally, an objective advantage may arise for
any of the reasons discussed in the economic considerations in PartICC)(1)-(4).
In practice, however, the application of the standard relies on
assumptions about market power. Business justifications receive
"sympathetic consideration" only if the joint venture poses no threat
to the competitive structure of the markets in question. Thus, the
standard is applied subject to strict market share limits which
"should not normally exceed 20% where cooperation between the
parents does not extend beyond production, and 10% when it in-
cludes marketing."'7 ' Within these limits, there is a presumption
that "the effects in terms of the exclusion of third parties, and the
risks in terms of barriers to entry are kept within reasonable pro-
portions and that the market structure will continue to ensure ef-
fective competition."'72
167. Draft Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 17. See also No-
tice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 10.




172. Id. See also Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 13. The
10% limit, however, is not a guaranteed safe-harbor. In the case of purchasing joint ven-
tures, for example, the Commission noted that they may be used as "an instrument for
the setting of uniform purchase prices and conditions and often of purchase quotas." Id. at
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In short, if a joint venture falls within the market share limits,
it will be subject to "almost automatic eligibility," meaning, in prac-
tice, that the Commission will merely send a "comfort letter."73
b. Individualized Scrutiny. If a joint venture exceeds the mar-
ket share thresholds discussed in the preceding subsection, creates a
network ofjoint ventures under common ownership or "helps further
to tighten an already narrow oligopoly"7 4 it will be subject to rigor-
ous individualized scrutiny under a balancing test that weighs the
potential benefits of the proposed agreement against the immediate
loss in competition that would result from the joint venture. Central
to any such analysis is the need to promote the objectives that com-
petition policy is designed to implement, namely, market integra-
tion, efficiency, innovation, and long-term competitiveness.' The
balancing test, therefore, includes a determination of whether these
goals can be accomplished more effectively through unbridled com-
petition or through cooperation in a joint venture.'76 Indeed, the
12. Accordingly, it was "prepared to grant exemptions only in exceptional cases and then
only if the parents retain the possibility of purchasing individually." Id.
173. Discussion Paper, supra note 14, at 3. In the Notice on Cooperative Joint Ven-
tures, supra note 14, the Commission does not use the terms "sympathetic consideration"
or "comfort letter." Adoption of the standard for the types ofjoint venture discussed in the
text, however, is clearly implied by the language. See id. at 11-13. Comfort letters are is-
sued pursuant to the Notice from the Commission on procedures concerning notification
pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation No 17/62, 1983 O.J. (C 295) 6. They state that
the Directorate-General for Competition "does not consider it necessary to pursue the
formal procedure through to the adoption of a Decsion under Article 85(3) in accordance
with Article 6 of Regulation No 17/62." I& at 7. Because they do not have the status of
formal decisions, these letters are not legally binding on the courts of Member States.
However, they do have evidentiary value in national proceedings. Joined Cases 253/78, 1-
3/79 Procureur de la Republique & Anor v. Bruno Giry & Ors, 1980 E.C.R. 2327.
174. Draft Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 18. See also
Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 11.
175. See supra part I(B). Although Article 85(3) requires that consumers be allowed
"a fair share of the resulting benefits" of a joint venture, the consumer benefit criterion is
not really an independent test. Rather, it is the natural conclusion of a satisfactory
analysis of the other requirements of Article 85(3). That is to say, if a joint venture: (i)
either reduces costs through rationalization or promotes technical progress; (ii) contains
no restrictions not necessary to the realization of the objectives of the agreement; and ('ii)
does not eliminate competition in a substantial part of the products in question, then it is
inevitable that the venture will be to the benefit of consumers. No separate analysis is re-
quired. If the market is functioning properly, the benefits of the joint venture will auto-
matically be passed on to the consumer in the form of lower prices, a broader selection of
goods and improved products. For the rather minimal consideration given to the con-
sumer benefit criterion, see Teko, 1990 O.J. (L 13) 34, 37-38; Reckwell/lveco, 1983 O.J. (L
224) 19, 26; Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik, 1990 O.J. (L 32) 19, 24; UIP, 1989
O.J. (L 226) 25, 31.
176. See, e.g., Re Bayer/Gist Brocades, 1976 O.J. (L 30) 13 ("The question of a contri-
bution to economic progress within the meaning of Article 85(3) can only arise in those
exceptional cases where the free play of competition is unable to produce the best result
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preservation of workable competition in the relevant market is fun-
damental to any decision.
177
The Commission weighs a number of factors when considering
whether workable competition could be said to exist in the relevant
market. Particular reference may be made to the following: the
number of other firms operating in the market of the joint venture
and the degree of concentration;' 7 the competitive pressures in the
world market and the threat of market entry by firms outside the
Community;179 countervailing purchasing power of the customers of
the joint venture; 8 ' the economic and financial strength of the par-
ent companies and their technical or commercial edge over competi-
tors;18 the existence of alternative technologies;' 8 'the threat of mar-
ket foreclosure to third parties."s
Unlike "almost automatic eligibility" scrutiny in which the Co-
mmission utilizes explicit and definite market share limits, no
definite percentage of the market is controlling. However, a share in
excess of 10% for a marketing agreement would certainly merit
heightened scrutiny. An upper limit is more difficult to determine.
Commission case law, however, supports the view that joint ven-
tures with as much as 20% of the relevant market may be permitted
when there are strong countervailing concerns.'84 Subject to main-
economically speaking").
177. "Workable competition" is that degree of competition which is essential to en-
sure the attainment of objectives set by the Treaty of Rome without eliminating compe-
tition in a substantial part of the common market. Case 26/76 Metro SB-Grossmarkte
GmbH & Co, KG v. Commission, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 1904. For the notion of workable com-
petition. See JOSEPH BOWRING, COMPETITION IN A DUAL ECONOMY 83 (1986) ("Definitions
of workable competition are an attempt to establish a set of standards for structure, con-
duct, and/or performance which guarantee 'acceptable' social results. Rigid enforcement of
the conditions required for perfect competition would be, it is argued, destructive and
counterproductive in a modern industrial setting."). The Commission has never intended
to institute a system of pure or perfect competition. Perfect competition in the economic
sense occurs "when the number of firms selling a homogeneous commodity is so large,
and each individual firm's share of the market is so small, that no individual firm finds
itself able to influence appreciably the commodity's price by varying the quantity of out-
put it sells." F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE (2d ed. 1980).
178. See, e.g., Carbon Gas Technologie, 1983 O.J. (L 376) 17, 21; BBC Brown Boveri,
1988 O.J. (L 301) 68, 72; Rockwell/Iveco, 1983 O.J. (L 224) 19, 27; Iveco/Ford, 1988 O.J. (L
230) 39, 43-44; Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 6.
179. See, e.g., Alcatel Espace, 1990 O.J. (L 226) 19, 25; Optical Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L
236) 30,40.
180. See, e.g., Optical Fibres, at 40; UIP, at 32; P&G/Finaf, 1992 O.J. (C 3) 2, 4.
181. Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 6.
182. See, e.g., Optical Fibres, at 40; BBC Brown Boveri, at 72.
183. See, e.g., Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 6.
184. In UIP, for example, the partners jointly controlled an average of 22% of the
Community market. UIP 1989 O.J. (L 226) 25, 32. See also Fiat/Hitachi, 1991 O.J. (C 206)
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taining workable competition,1' the extent to which the Commission
permits competitive distortion in the short-term depends on the
nature of the compensatory benefits to which the joint venture can
reasonably be expected to give rise. Further, the Commission re-
serves the right to modify its original decision regarding the joint
venture in light of changing circumstances.'"
4. Ancillary Restrictions. Even where a joint venture does not
fall within Article 85(1) or is exempted from the prohibition, further
constraints upon the effect of competitive coordination are set by the
terms of Article 85(3)(a) which prohibit competitive "restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of [the agreement's]
objectives." 8 A restriction is deemed indispensable if the joint ven-
ture "could not be implemented or could only be implemented under
more uncertain conditions, at substantially higher costs, over an ap-
preciably longer period or with considerably less probability of suc-
cess."188 The Commission terms restrictions that are necessary and
reasonable in this sense as "ancillary." More precisely, ancillary re-
strictions are those restrictions which are "directly related and nec-
3, 4 (proposing to exempt joint venture notwithstanding 16% market share).
185. Metro SB, at 1904 (Mhe nature and intensiveness of competition may vary to
an extent dictated by the products or services in question and the economic structure of
the relevant market sectors.").
186. See, e.g., Optical Fibres, at 40 (reserving the right to revoke the exemption if the
joint venturers "were to bring successful patent infringement actions in the EEC and to
refuse, without good reasons, to grant licenses to third parties") and XXTH REPORT, supra
note 31, at 79 (stating, with reference to a cooperation agreement between KSB, Goulds,
Lowara and ITT for the development of new pumps, that the exemption would be re-
voked, if necessary, "to prevent structural changes which might occur to the disadvantage
of competitors"). Additionally, Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 5, art. 8 states:
1. A decision in application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty shall be issued for a
specified period and conditions and obligations may be attached thereto.
2. A decision may on application be renewed if the requirements of Article
85(3) of the Treaty continue to be satisfied.
3. The Commission may revoke or amend its decision or prohibit specified
acts by the parties:
(a) where there has been a change in any of the facts which were basic to the
making of the decision.
(d) where the parties abuse the exemption from the provisions of Article 85(1) of
the Treaty granted to them by the decision.
Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 5, art. 8.
187. EEC TREATY art. 85(3).
188. Commission Notice Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations, 1990
O.J. (C 203) 6. See also Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 13 ("In
particular, in determining the necessity of the restriction, it is proper not only to take ac-
count of its nature, but equally to ensure that its duration, subject-matter and geographi-
cal field of application, do not exceed what the creation and operation of the joint venture
reasonably requires.").
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essary to the establishment and operation of the joint venture in so
far as they cannot be disassociated from it without jeopardizing its
existence... [but which] remain subordinate in importance to the
main object of the joint venture."189 Accordingly, whether a restric-
tion is necessary requires a determination of the reasonableness of
the restriction in relation to the goal sought to be achieved. 190
A common type of restrictive covenant found in many joint
ventures, particularly in research and development agreements, is
the allocation of rights in the intellectual property contributed to
and developed by the joint venture. The Commission, however, has
been sympathetic to both the desire of parents to restrict the use of
technologies that they contribute to their joint ventures' 9' and the
need of the joint ventures for certain territorial protections during
the period of a patent or know-how license. Block Exemption Regu-
lations on patent and know-how licensing agreements provide, for
example, that where the parent companies are competitors, they
189. Draft Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 18-19. In the
specialization, and research and development block exemption regulations, the Commis-
sion created what are commonly termed black and white lists of prohibited and permitted
provisions that would pass muster under this test. See, e.g., Commission Regulation on
Specialization Agreements, supra note 81, art. 2; Commission Regulation on Research
and Development Agreements, supra note 81, arts. 4-6.
190. Parent companies are likely to insist on a number of restrictions to protect their
own financial and commercial interests. The following are typical:
agreement between parent companies to make "reasonable efforts" to ensure
that their associates did not to compete with the joint venture in the field of the
cooperation and that, where possible, they purchased their own requirements
from the venture. Vacuum Interrupters Ltd, 1977 O.J. (L 48) 32, 38; agreement
not to conclude research and development projects with third parties in the field
of cooperation for fifteen years. BBC Brown Boveri, 1988 O.J. (L 301) 68, 73;
agreement between parent companies not to compete with the joint venture in a
specific geographical area. Iveco/Ford, 1988 O.J. (L 230) 39, 42; agreement bar-
ring the parent companies from competing with the joint venture or from com-
peting actively with it on its territory during the starting-up period. Notice on
Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 14; agreement not to develop cer-
tain products entrusted to the other partner under a rationalization program.
Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik, 1990 O.J. (L 32) 19, 25; agreement to
satisfy total product requirements from the joint venture. Reckwell/Iveco, 1983
(O.J. L 224) 19, 27; agreement not to exploit technical know-how acquired
through the joint venture in the event of early withdrawal. Carbon Gas Tech-
nologie, 1983 O.J. (L 376) 17,20.
On the other hand, "restrictions relating to quantities; prices or customers, and export
bans obviously go beyond what is required for the settng-up and operation of the joint
venture." Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 14.
191. See Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 20 ("[T]he joint ven-
ture must seek to ensure the success of the new production unit, without depriving the
parent companies of the necessary control over exploitation and dissemination of their
technology") and BBC Brown Boveri, 1988 O.J. (L 301) 68, 71 (joint venture undertakes
not to exploit the partners' technology with third parties).
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may grant their joint venture exclusive territorial manufacture and
distribution licenses subject to market share limits of 20% or 10%
where the joint venture respectively manufactures or manufactures
and distributes the licensed products.'92 The degree of control over
subsequent improvements is the subject of more rigorous scrutiny
and is determined by consideration of all the circumstances sur-
rounding the agreement. 193
Ill. U.S.-E.C. JOINT VENTURES
The prospect of a single European market has prompted a
substantial increase in the number of international joint ventures in
the E.C.' M Although part of this growth must be attributed to inter-
national concern about the creation of a Fortress Europe and the
desire to avoid discriminatory treatment by the governments of
Member States, 95 many of the ventures do not appear to have been
motivated by defensive considerations. 196 In fact, some of the most
interesting Commission Decisions have concerned non-E.C. firms
using joint ventures positively as a means to participate in the crea-
192. Commission Regulation 151193, supra note 81, arts. 3-4. The original patent and
know-how block exemptions did not apply to "agreements between competitors who hold
interests in a joint venture or between one of them and the joint venture, if the licensing
agreements relate to the activities of the joint venture." Commission Regulation on Pat-
ent Licensing Agreements, supra note 81, art. 5(2).
193. Compare BBC Brown Boveri, at 69-71 (grant by joint venture to E.C. parent of
exclusive territorial license in new technology within the E.C.) and Commission Regula-
tion on Research and Development Agreements, supra note 81, art. 5(1)(d) (permissible
for parties to undertake obligation "to preserve the confidentiality of any know-how re-
ceived or jointly developed under the research and development program") with Optical
Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L 236) 30, 37 (joint venture must grant back, but only on a
non-exclusive basis, improvements relating to the licensed technology).
194. The annual statistics contained in COMMIsSION, COMPETITION REPORTS show an
increase in the number of industrial joint ventures between E.C. and international part-
ners from 15 in 1982 to 60 in 1990. See supra notes 31, 33, 35. The decline in this number
to 45 in 1991 probably reflects the depressed states of the European and other interna-
tional economies rather than signaling a definitive break in the trend. The Commission
has suggested that the number of joint ventures with Community partners may increase
as the final regulatory and political, barriers to cooperation are eliminated. Commission,
The Economics of 1992, supra note 9, at 136.
195. See, e.g., Pulling Up the Drawbridge, THE ECONOMIST, June 8, 1991, at 20.
196. The evidence of motive is sparse but the Commission suggests that joint ven-
tures are undertaken mainly because firms:
increasingly want to spread the risk of costly new technological development;
are tending to concentrate more on the fields of activity in which they have a
great deal of experience, while seeking, via JVs, to remain abreast of new and
promising developments in other fields;
want to step outside what are often still the national confines of their markets
and gain a foothold in other regions of the Community.
Draft Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures, supra note 14, at 2.
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tion of the new environment. Indeed, U.S.-E.C. partnerships are rec-
ognized as important vehicles towards E.C. economic integration,
efficiency and international competitiveness. This Part considers
how U.S. corporations can use joint ventures within the framework
of European integration to advance their own commerial objectives.
A. The "Constraints" of E.C. Competition Law
1. The Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures.197 Although the
competition rules addressed in part II were drafted primarily with
E.C. companies in mind, they are applied equally to all joint ven-
tures irrespective of the national origin of their parents. Not surpris-
ingly, because their application depends largely on assumptions
concerning the distortion of competition based on E.C. market share,
the rules actually work to the advantage of international joint ven-
tures198 by creating opportunities not available to wholly owned E.C.
joint ventures. U.S. corporations, for example, are less likely than
their E.C. counterparts to have substantial sales or market share in
the Community so that, in theory, U.S.-E.C. joint ventures are more
likely to meet the conditions of an automatic exemption. Likewise, in
many instances, U.S. corporations will not be considered potential
competitors of prospective E.C. partners because, as a practical
matter, it is difficult for them to make the kinds of investment in
distribution networks that would make them realistic market en-
trants. As a result, U.S.-E.C. joint ventures are more likely to fall
outside the prohibition of Article 85(1).
Many U.S.-E.C. joint ventures, however, will have varying de-
grees of impact on competition within the Community because of a
prior actual or potential competitive relationship between the parent
companies and will, therefore, be subject to review. The Notice on
Cooperative Joint Ventures and various amendments to the block
exemptions provide detailed guidance as to the type of analysis that
will be applied to these agreements. At the same time, these changes
increase the attractiveness of joint ventures as a means of accom-
plishing the parents' strategic objectives. The changes should bring
four principal benefits to U.S. corporations.
First, the sales threshold required for an exemption under the
Regulation on Specialization Agreements has been increased from
E.C.U. 500 milion to E.C.U. 1 billion.9 9 This increase enlarges the
pool of prospective E.C. partners for joint ventures that would be
eligible for automatic exemption from the prohibition of Article 85(1).
197. Supra note 14.
198. International joint venture refers to a joint venture in the E.C. involving at
least one non-E.C. parent company.
199. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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Second, the group exemptions for specialization and research
and development joint ventures have been expanded to marketing
arrangements. This gives U.S. firms the option, without notification
to the Commission, to implement their objectives with E.C. partners
through full-function joint ventures rather than through a par-
tial-function joint venture whose production had to be distributed
independently by the parent companies.
Third, amendments to the Regulations on Patent and
Know-how Licensing Agreements permit parent companies that
stand in a competitive relationship to grant exclusive territorial
manufacture and distribution licenses to their joint venture.200 This
change should facilitate the transfer of technologies between com-
panies most able to exploit the opportunities of combining comple-
mentary know-how.
Finally, the Notice sanctions the application of an "almost
automatic eligibility for exemption" standard to certain categories of
joint ventures.20 ' This standard gives the parents increased flexibil-
ity in structuring their joint venture by removing the incentive to
plan solely around the prospect of an exemption under the narrowly
construed conditions of the group exemptions.0 2
It is important to note that the amendments do not signal a
change in substantive policy toward joint ventures. Rather they
serve to facilitate the conclusion of transactions that were already
deemed beneficial and to streamline the necessary notification pro-
cedures.
2. Strategic Uses of U.S.-E.C. Joint Ventures. U.S. firms work-
ing within the framework of E.C. competition law, both before and
after the adoption of the various amendments, have been able to use
E.C. joint ventures to enhance their position in the Community.
Commission case law demonstrates how U.S. firms through joint
ventures have been able to change market structures to their advan-
tage through rationalization, technology transfers and new produc-
tion methods. Moreover, U.S. firms have also used joint ventures to
acquire know-how from their E.C. partners which can be exploited to
their competitive advantage in the United States.
200. See Amendment Regulation 151/93, supra note 81, arts. 3-4.
201. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
202. See Lessons from U.S. Law, Interview: Professor Eleanor M. Fox, ANTrITRUST 8,
11 (Fall/Winter 1991) ("The problem is that block exemptions steer deals into a very nar-
row framework. Business people find themselves doing deals in terms they would not
otherwise choose."). See also Margot Horspol & Valentine Korah, Competition, 38 THE
ANTrrRUST BuLL. 337, 357 (1992) ("The drawback of proceeding by regulating agreements
through providing group exemptions is that some agreements are distorted by the parties
to come within them.").
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a. Optical Fibres.0 3 Coming Glass, a manufacturer of optical fi-
bers, entered into several joint ventures with cable makers in the
United Kingdom, Germany and France. The objective of the ven-
tures was the development, production and sale of optical fibers and
cables, "a high technology product with significant advantages" over
comparable and competing technologies." 4 Corning and its E.C.
partners were neither actual nor potential competitors and their
technologies were complementary rather than in direct competi-
tion. 5 Nevertheless, the Commission expressed concern over the
potential anti-competitive effects of a network of ventures under
Corning's control since it was a common technology provider in an
oligopolistic market. "In this oligopoly, trade between Member
States is bound to develop along different lines than would other-
wise be the case and therefore to be affected appreciably when in-
ter-related joint ventures, licensees and subsidiaries are subject to
influence and coordination by a common partner."2 6
After establishing a legitimate argument against the joint
ventures, the Commission then considered the benefits to European
global competitiveness that were likely to result from a contribution
of Corning's technology. In its view, Corning's oltical fiber
know-how was essential "to enable the European companies to
withstand competition from non-Community producers, especially in
the USA and Japan."2 7 Reluctant to forego such an advantage, the
Commission, after hedging the agreements by adding clauses to pre-
vent Coming from exploiting its control over the network, 208 ex-
empted the joint ventures from the prohibition of Article 85(1).
The result of the Commission's action was that Corning had
been able not only to conclude agreements with three leaders in the
E.C. cable industry but also to secure the uniform development of its
technology in the Community through a non-exclusive grant-back
clause for improvements. As a result, Corning acquired a strong
position in the E.C. market for optical fibers and limited the ability
203. Optical Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L 236) 30.
204. Id. at 38.
205. Id. at 36.
206. Id. at 38.
207. Id. The Commission rejected other possibly less restrictive options available to
the partners such as marketing fibers imported from the United States, the establish-
ment of fully owned plants in the E.C. or the grant of licenses. Under any of these op-
tions, "there would be no transfer of technology to the European companies and therefore
no dissemination of Coming's technology." Id. at 39.
208. Id. at 40. For example, Coming was required to reduce its management, voting
and veto rights in the joint ventures and the joint ventures undertook to sell their prod-
ucts "to all users on non-discriminatory terms [to ensure] ... that competitors of the par-




of its competition to establish a similar bridgehead. Corning was
also positioned to be the principal beneficiary of a shift in the de-
mand curve in the communications technology market in the E.C.
b. Rockwell Iveco. 09 A similar outcome resulted from a joint
venture between Rockwell and its E.C. partner, Iveco, to develop a
new axle for heavy trucks. Rockwell, a specialized axle manufac-
turer, granted an exclusive license to the joint venture to manufac-
ture its proprietary axles while Iveco, a truck manufacturer, trans-
ferred its entire axle manufacturing capacity and agreed to satisfy
its total axle requirements from the venture.21 0 After the agreement
the axle market in the Community was split approximately
80%-20% between manufacturers of trucks that produced axles on
their own account and companies that produced for the free market.
Finding that the joint venture would not jeopardize competition
in the free market and would contribute to technological innovation
in the Community, the Commission exempted the agreement from
the prohibition of Article 85(1).211 It further remarked that the joint
venture was likely to "induc[e] truck manufacturers to change their
policy regarding production on their own account and to purchase
axles from third parties and start a trend which creates a more com-
petitive situation on this market, from which the other free axle
manufacturers could also benefit."212 The Commission, therefore,
explicitly recognized that through joint ventures that exploit syner-
gies and introduce new production methods and technologies
non-E.C. firms can help to create the market structures of an inte-
grated Europe.
Corning and Rockwell are U.S. firms which have sought to use
joint ventures as a way to improve their competitive positions in the
E.C. Corning used its superior technology as leverage to secure
market power in a rapidly growing area of technology,2 13 while
Rockwell acquired a guaranteed outlet for its production and at-
tempted to create new market structures by altering the way in
which potential customers conducted their business. The effects of
U.S.-E.C. joint ventures, however, need not be confined to markets
209. Rockwell/veco, 1983 O.J. (L 224) 19.
210. Id. at 24-25.
211. Id. at 27.
212. Id.
213. Optical Fibres illustrates the type of joint venture that is subject to rigorous ex-
amination under the individualized scrutiny standard discussed in Part II(C)(3)(b). The
threat to workable competition in this case arose from the possibility of changes in mar-
ket structure that would exclude competitors from access to the state of the art technol-
ogy developed by the joint ventures. Optical Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L 236) 30. Where the dan-
ger of market foreclosure is apparent, the parent companies will obviously be required to




in the E.G. They could be used as a springboard for activities in ex-
port markets and even as a means to gain a competitive advantage
over domestic competition in the United States. This theme is more
pronounced in the following case.
c. Fiat/Deere III.214 Deere entered an agreement with a sub-
sidiary of Fiat SpA of Italy to share the development of a range of
medium-sized crawler tractor loaders and crawler tractor dozers.
The E.C. markets for these products were highly concentrated with
Caterpillar, Fiat and Komatsu controlling more than 80% of both
markets.2 15 Deere, on the other hand, sold neither product in the
E.C. Although it would be logical to assume that Deere was a poten-
tial competitor whose independent entry into the markets might
lead to some degree of deconcentration, the Commission did not dis-
cuss this issue but merely stated that, without prejudice to later
proceedings, the agreement "may be exempted under Article
85(3).216
Deere's use of the joint development agreement is instructive.
Disavowing any purpose to enter the E.C. markets for the contract
products,217 its primary intent in pooling resources was to acquire
access to complementary technology with a view to the exclusive
exploitation of any developments in the United States and other
American markets. Both aspects of the agreement undoubtedly gave
Deere the opportunity to enhance its competitive position in the
United States. It is important to recognize, however, that the struc-
ture of the agreement would have been determined in large part by
changes then occurring in E.C. markets. The Commission would
have evaluated the arrangement in light of the type of factors dis-
cussed in part I(B) and (C)(1)-(4). From its perspective, the joint
venture was an appropriate response to the broader economic
change shaping the Community.218 In effect, Deere traded the ad-
vantages that Fiat and the Commission anticipated within the E.C.
for similar benefits for itself in the United States.2 19
214. Fiat/Deere, 1992 O.J. (L 87) 3.
215. Id. at 3.
216. Id. at 4.
217. Under the agreement, both parties were to transfer their existing technology to
the venture, undertake certain stages of production and would become co-owners of
jointly developed know-how. The agreement also provided that Fiat would have exclusive
territorial rights to market the new products in Europe, Africa and the Middle East while
Deere would have similar rights in North, Central and South America. Further, the par-
ties undertook to discourage parallel trade by third parties into their respective exclusive
territories with the exception of the Community. Id. at 3-4.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., De Laval-Stork, 1977 O.J. (L 215) 11 (holding a joint venture between
parent companies who together held between 10% - 15% of the Community market for
steam turbines exempted because, by making it easier for an international company to
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d. International Joint Ventures in the E.C. There is a slight
irony, however, in the fact that U.S. and other international corpo-
rations can play such an active role in the evolution of the single
European market. After all, one of the principal purposes was to en-
hance the competitiveness of E.C. companies in world markets. This
sentiment is reflected in the "vestigial thought"220 that the national-
ity of a corporation should be a relevant factor in a government's
policy toward that corporation. Although the single market initiative
should have debunked this myth at the national level, the mentality
seems to have reappeared on a European scale in the advocacy of
interventionist policies designed to ensure that large European
companies acquire leadership in the technologies of the future. In-
ternational joint ventures are reminders that economic welfare is
perhaps more soundly based on an openness to private investment
and the pursuit of alliances with more advanced companies else-
where. One may also expect that such a policy would lead to greater
international economic integration and a relaxation in tensions be-
tween the major trading partners.
B. Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust Law to
U.S.-E.C. Joint Ventures
The potential use of U.S.-E.C. joint ventures to effect strategic
objectives in the United States and other markets, notwithstanding
exemption under E.C. competition law, a joint venture might be
prohibited under applicable provisions of the federal antitrust
laws.22' United States courts have frequently asserted extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over conduct initiated abroad. Reflecting a degree of
uncertainty as to the exact basis of their jurisdiction, however, they
have used various tests to determine when federal antitrust law is
properly applied in the international context.222
penetrate the E.C., it increased competition with larger companies while allowing its
Community partner to reorganize and expand its business); Iveco/Ford, 1993 O.J. (L 20)
14 (holding a joint venture to develop and produce multi-purpose vehicles in Portugal ex-
empt since it would increase competition in the concentrated multi-purpose vehicle mar-
ket and would have positive effects on infrastructure and employment in an underdevel-
oped region of the Community); P&GIFinaf, 1992 O.J. (C 3) 2, 4 (holding a joint venture to
manufacture sanitary protection products exempt because it would strengthen compe-
tition in Italy, Spain and Portugal); KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT, 1991 O.J. (L 19) 25 (holding
a joint venture exempt notwithstanding the high market share held by the dominant
partner since participation of all parent companies was required to create viable econo-
mies of scale in research and production and to enhance probability of successful innova-
tion.)
220. ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 137-68 (1992).
221. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1914);
Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1914).
222. See, e.g., Matsushita Electric & Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574
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Many of the factors considered by the courts have been incorpo-
rated by the Department of Justice in its antitrust analysis of inter-
national operations.' The Department's position is that federal law
is properly applicable to the conduct of domestic or foreign firms
having a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
the interstate, import or export commerce of the United States. 224 Its
policy, however, has been to act only when the "adverse effects on
competition harm U.S. consumers by reducing output or raising
prices."225 Subject to considerations of comity, 226 the Department will
evaluate a U.S.-E.C. joint venture under the rule of reason.227
The Department asks whether the elimination of competition
through the joint venture "would likely create, enhance, or facilitate
(1986) (the double effects doctrine); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945) (the intent and effect test); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (a balancing of interests test); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the reasonableness test).
223. See Guidelines for International Operations, which lists factors such as:
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within the
United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or
competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the
United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated
by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic poli-
cies.
Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 2, at 22.
224. Id. at 20 (citing Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §
7 et seq. (1988)).
225. Id. at 21 n.159. Based on the text of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act, however, it is unclear why the Department's policy should be restricted in this man-
ner. Former Chairman Representative Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee stated
that "[tihe bill will establish that restraints on export trade only violate the Sherman Act
if they have a direct and substantial effect on commerce within the United States or on a
domestic firm competing for foreign trade." H.R. REP. NO. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8
(1982) (emphasis added).
226. See Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 2, at 29.
227. Under the rule of reason, the Department asks whether the joint venture poses
any significant anticompetitive risks. If the venture presents no serious risk of anticom-
petitive harm, it is permitted. Where, however, there is significant danger of anticom-
petitive harm the Department must consider "whether any procompetitive efficiencies
that the parties claim would be achieved by the joint venture would outweigh the risk of
anticompetitive harm." Id. at 12-13. Agreements that are "naked" restraints of trade, on
the other hand, such as price-fixing, will be condemned per se without extensive consid-
eration of their effects. Id. at 6. For the basic contrast between the per se and rule of rea-
son analyses, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 nn.15-16
(1977).
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the exercise of market power in the relevant market."22 While as-
suming that the joint ventures are merging their interests,2 9 the
Department bases its response on the degree of market concentra-
tion as calculated under the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.o The
Department defines certain concentration "safe harbors" within
which it presumes that "the structure of the market itself indicates
that the successful exercise of market power" is unlikely. 3 1 Beyond
these "safe harbors" it is a working principle that the threat of anti-
competitive harm increases in proportion to the degree of market
concentration after the hypothetical merger. As the degree of market
concentration rises, the Department requires the parties to prove
"offsetting procompetitive efficiencies on the basis of clear and con-
vincing evidence" 12 when market concentration does in fact in-
crease.
In addition to the foregoing analysis of the Department of Jus-
tice, U.S. courts have considered the status of joint ventures under
federal antitrust law.3 In particular, courts have acted where the
228. Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 2, at 12.
229. Id. at 12.
230. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the sum of the squares of the market
shares of the individual firms in the market. Id. at 9 n.70. The Department classifies a
market as unconcentrated if the HI is below 1000, moderately concentrated if the HHI
is between 1000 and 1800, or highly concentrated if the HHI exceeeds 1800. Id.
231. Id. The Department will not challenge a merger if the merger would result in an
HHI of less than 1000; moderate concentration and the level of concentration will in-
crease by 100 HHI points or less; or high concentration and the level of concentration will
increase by 50 HHI points or less. These 'safe harbors" may be applied in the joint ven-
ture context. Id. at 12.
232. Id. at 13. Offsetting benefits include realization of economies of scale, the
pooling of complementary technologies and risk-sharing. For working case examples of
the Department's involving research and development joint ventures, and the distribution
of a foreign competitors product see id. at 31-35, 35-36. See also United States v. Ivaco,
Inc. 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (enjoining proposed joint venture between two
of the three firms in the market for automatic tampers for railraods since it would result
in control of 70% of the market and was likely to inhibit competition); United States v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1989-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 168,607 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(allowing a joint venture between two producers and suppliers of electrical power, equip-
ment and services, one a U.S. firm and one a European firm, upon the condition that the
European firm divest of another U.S. firm to a third party so that it may act as a competi-
tor in the U.S. market); United States v. Hercules Inc., 1973 Trade Cases (CCH) 174,530
(D. Del. 1973) (dissolving, pursuant to a consent decree, a joint venture undertaken by
Japanesse and American companies into the manufacture of high density polyethylene);
United States v. Monsanto Co., 1967 Trade Cases (CGH) 172,001 (W.D. Pa. 1967)
(requiring Monsanto, under the terms of a consent decree, to sell it shares of the newly
created firm to its co-venturer). See also 2 WILBuR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
THE ANTITRUST LAws §11.3 (4th ed. 1991).
233. U.S. courts use a similar, though not identical, rule of reason methodology. See,
e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 302 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1979) (listing relevant variables in rule of reason analysis including:
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parent companies in a U.S.-E.C. joint venture were actual competi-
tors in the United States market. For example, relying on dicta of
the Supreme Court in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,234
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied a two factor test
to determine when an international joint venture between potential
competitors would violate the antitrust laws. The court stated that
"[f]irst, it must be shown that the alleged potential entrant had
'available feasible means' for entering the relevant market, and sec-
ond, that those means offer[ed] a substantial likelihood of ultimately
producing deconcentration of that market or other significant pro-
competitive effects."25 After considering these factors, the Court of
Appeals held that a joint venture eliminating the likely prospect of
independent entry into a concentrated and non-competitive market
by a leading foreign corporation constituted a violation of §7 of the
Clayton Act and §5 of the Federal Trade Commisson Act.236 On the
other hand, "there would be no need for concern about the prospects
of long-term deconcentration of a market which is in fact genuinely
competitive. 2m 7
the size of the joint venturers; their share of their respective markets; the contributions of
each party to the venture and the benefits derived; the likelihood that, in the absence of
the joint effort, one or both parties would undertake a similar project, either alone or with
a smaller firm in the other market; the nature of the ancillary restraints imposed and the
reasonableness of their relationship to the purposes of the venture).
For differences in ideology and approach between the Department of Justice and the
federal courts, see Maria Sendra, Strategic Alliances for Innovation in the Global Market
of the 1990s: A Comparative Study of the Relationship Between Innovation and the Pat-
ent/Antitrust Mechanisms of the United States and the European Economic Community,
9 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 382, 393-99 (1991/1992).
234. 378 U.S. 158 (1964). Under the Supreme Court's holding in that case, the fac-
tors to be considered in analyzing the likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition
as a result of entry by a potential competitor include:
the number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; the back-
ground of their growth; the power of the joint venturers; the relationship of
their lines of commerce; ... the reasons and necessities for its existence... ;
the potential power of the joint venture in the relevant market; an appraisal of
what the competition in the relevant market would have been if one of the joint
venturers had entered it alone;.., and such other factors as might indicate po-
tential risk to competition in the relevant market.
378 U.S. at 177. The Court noted that, under §7 of the Clayton Act, supra note 221, these
factors should be weighed "in terms of the probability of a lessening of substantial com-
petition, not in terms of tangible present restraint." Id.
235. Yamaha Motor Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 657 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1981)
(citing United States v. Marine Bancorporation Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 633 (1974)), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
236. Id.
237. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 630-31 (1974) cited in In
the Matter of Brunswick Corp., et al., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1271 (1979). See also In the Matter
of General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 386 (1984) (holding that the procompetitive
benefits of a GM-Toyota joint venture which introduced a new line of small cars and en-
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As the degree of market concentration in the United States in-
creases, U.S.-E.C. joint ventures that raise serious antitrust issues
under federal law will be the exceptions rather than the rule.238 In-
deed, a U.S.-E.C. joint venture that poses a threat to U.S. competi-
tion would also threaten the maintenance of workable competition in
the E.C. and thus fail to meet the conditions of indvidual exemption
under Article 85(3). Nevertheless, the possibility that joint venture
agreements will be given different interpretations in the future
should not be discounted. It is certainly possible that the respective
antitrust authorities will evaluate the potential benefits of the more
problematic types of joint ventures from the perspective of conflict-
ing policy goals. s9 In Fiat/Deere III,24 for example, the Commission
made certain assumptions about industry consolidation within the
E.C. which could be completely irrelevant to an evaluation by the
Department of Justice. Further, whereas the Commission may con-
sider that exclusive dealing and exclusive licensing arrangements
are ancillary and indispensable to the success of particular joint
ventures and would be of benefit to consumers in the E.C., federal
authorities may take the view that they are a ruse for international
market division which impedes the sale and purchase opportunities
of U.S. competitors. Conflicts of this type would need to be resolved
within the framework of the recent U.S.-E.C. agreement on compe-
tition laws.24'
abled GM to learn about Japanese production techniques outweighed the anticompetitive
effects of the agreement); United States v. Fed. Communications Comnm'n, 652 F.2d 72
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the technological advances in special communications ven-
ture between IBM, Aetna and Comsat General Business Communications outweighed the
anticompetitive effects).
238. For a recent example of the market concentration approach in the international
context, see Nippon Sheet Glass Company Ltd., et al.; Proposed Consent Agreement With
Analysis To Aid Public Comment, 55 Fed. Reg. 11256 (1990); the commentary on this case
by Deborah K Owen and John J. Parisi, International Mergers and Joint Ventures: A
Federal Trade Commission Perspective, in FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 1990:
INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES 1, 16-19 (Barry Hawk ed., 1991).
239. Cf Diane P. Wood, International Competition Policy in a Diverse World: Can
One Size Fit All, in FORDHAmi CORPORTE LAW INSTITUTE: E.C. AND US COMPETrION LAW
AND POLICY 671 (Barry Hawk ed., 1992).
240. 1992 O.J. (C 87) 3.
241. Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Sept.
23, 1991, Hein's No. KAV 3050, Temp. State Dep't No. 91-216. See, e.g., Article II:
NOTIFICATION
1. Each Party shall notify the other whenever its competition authorities be-
come aware that their enforcement activities may affect important interests of
the other Party.
2. Enforcement activities as to which notification ordinarily will be appropriate
include those that:
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CONCLUSION: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN
U.S.-E.C. INTERFIRM COOPERATION
Industrial restructuring across Europe offers an unprecedented
opportunity for direct participation in the development of a vast and
affluent market. In addition to its current population of approxi-
mately 325 million people, the Community is likely to accept new
members in the near future from the European Free Trade Associa-
tione 2 and, in the medium to longer terms, from the former Soviet
bloc.m In addition, the Community is well situated for exploitation
of the new markets opening in Eastern Europe.m
Joint ventures with E.C. companies are also set to assume an
increasingly important role in the competitive strategies of U.S. cor-
porations. As reduced information and transportation costs make
formerly distant foreign markets more attractive investment pros-
pects, 5 joint ventures, which have long been recognized as an ex-
peditious way of securing access to new markets through partners
with regional expertise,26 should continue to be a popular form of
business association in the Community."
More generally, for several reasons joint ventures offer an ef-
fective means of adjusting to and promoting the technological
a) Are relevant to enforcement activities of the other Party;
b) Involve anticompetitive activities ... carried out in significant part in the
other Party's territory;...
d) Involve conduct believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by
the other Party;, or
e) Involve remedies that would, in significant respects, require or prohibit con-
duct in the other Party's territory.
242. The members of the EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland. Hungary, Bulgaria Latest Nations to Sign Trade Agreements
with EFTA, INT'L TRADE REP., March 31, 1993. Austria and Sweden will probably join the
E.C. in January 1995. See Dennis Swann, The single European market in context, XXXVII
THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 283, 302-303 (1992).
243. See id.
244. See, e.g., An American Business Perspective of the Single Market, EUROPE, Feb.
1993, at 27, 28 ("As you see the central and eastern European opportunities moving into
the forefront in the years ahead, the single market is the most logical entry point to scale
your operations to treat Eastern Europe as well.").
245. COLLINS & DOORLEY, supra note 1, at 5.
246. See, e.g., John R. Wille, Joint-Venturing Strategies, in HANDBOOK OF JOINT
VENTURING, supra note 1, at 3, 11 [hereinafter Wille, Joint Venturing Stategies]; Ellen R.
Auster, International Corporate Linkages: Dynamic Forms in Changing Environments,
XXII COLUm. J. WORLD Bus. Summer 1987, at 3,4.
247. See, e.g., Janet Guyon, Business Plan: Foreign competition will change the face
of Europe's corporate landscape, WALL ST. J. Feb. 3, 1993, at R7 ("For all companies, the
trick to prospering in the coming decade will be to expand globally while adapting to local
tastes, a gambit being called 'glocalization.' Europe may be becoming a single market, but
it isn't homogeneous in products, style or prices.").
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change that is essential to commercial success in an increasingly
international trading environment. 2 First, joint ventures permit
the parent companies to diversify the risk of large capital invest-
ments required to develop new generations of products.2 9 They can
be used by small and medium-sized companies to remain competi-
tive with larger companies as well as by market leaders about to
embark on an unusually risky project.20 Second, as the complexity
and expense of new product development more frequently requires
firms to develop more specialized areas of expertise, joint ventures
will allow the parent companies to exploit their proprietary knowl-
edge with the complementary technologies of their partners to de-
velop new applications.251 Third, joint ventures enable the partners
to acquire essential know-how and production techniques quickly. Of
course, ready access to new technologies grows in importance as
product lives become shorter due to the pace of technological change
and the ability of firms rapidly to emulate the innovations of their
competitors." Finally, joint ventures enable firms to pool their hu-
man resources to solve problems beyond the reach of the individual
firms.ms Access to the knowledge and experience of "symbolic ana-
lysts"2 4 is the competitive advantage on which, more than any other,
commercial success in the new skills economy depends. 5
The foregoing suggests that joint ventures are a necessary
means of acquiring competitive strength in changing markets. In-
deed, they can be used by parent companies to "forc[e] their indus-
tries' structures to evolve in a favorable manner."256 As technological
248. See COLLINS & DOORLEY, supra note 1, at 7-8; HARRIGAN, supra note 1, at 10-13.
249. Wille, Joint Venturing Strategies, supra note 246, at 14-15.
250. See, e.g., Now for the really big one, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1993 at 57 (on
Boeing's invitation to members of the Airbus consortium to discuss a feasibility study on a
super-jumbo jet).
251. See, e.g., ROBERT P. LYNCH, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO JOINT VENTURES AND
CORPORATE ALLIANCES 9 (1989) [hereinafter LYNCH] (referring to the "hybridization" of
technologies as the process by which firms develop new products through the acquisition
of know-how which they lack the breadth of knowledge to develop themselves); HAR-
RIGAN, supra note 1, at 17-18.
252. See, e.g., COLLINS & DOORLEY, supra note 1, at 6 ("[Multinationals must be
prepared to use strategic partnerships to acquire the best technology from... outside);
LYNCH, supra note 264, at 9 (asserting that it is essential to introduce a good product on
time or suffer a loss of potential market share).
253. See LYNCH, supra note 251, at 10.
254. REICH, supra note 220 (symbolic analysts conceptualize problems, devise solu-
tions and plan their execution). For the role of "symbolic analysts" in the global economy,
see id. at 171-240.
255. Cf id. at 87-97 (asserting that the most profitable firms are those which consist
of symbolic anlysts guiding ideas through the enterprise).
256. HARRIGAN, supra note 1, at 19 (citing Kathryn R. Harrigan, Joint Ventures and
Global Strategies, XIX COLUMI. J. WORLD Bus., Summer 1984, at 7.
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advance in many sectors blur the boundaries between formerly dis-
tinct activities, 7 partnerships between firms with complementary
technologies will serve as an effective vehicle with which to exploit
the new business environments created.25
Joint ventures' unlimited potential has not gone unnoticed by
the Community. Rather, the Commission's single market initiative
is an unprecedented step towards the internationalization of product
markets. Accordingly, cooperative joint ventures have been a popu-
lar form of adaptation for E.C. firms. Now, in partnerships with non-
E.C. companies, they may act as a stimulus for further global eco-
nomic integration. Certainly, the statistics suggest that E.C. firms
are actively seeking new sources of competitive strength in domestic
and international markets and are more willing than in the past to
conclude alliances that promise an infusion of international capital
and new ideas." 9 Given this willingness and the importance of
broader economic changes currently shaping Europe the Community
will continue to attract U.S. joint venturers seeking their own ad-
vantages in international markets.
257. Kathryn R. Harrigan, Strategic Alliances: Their New Role in Global Competiti-
on, XXII COLUmn. J. WORLD Bus. Summer 1987, at 67, 69.
258. For an example of this type of global strategic thinking, see BT and EDS: Digi-
tal Dating, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at 68 (commenting on the response of Britain's
BT and America's Electronic Data Systems to the growing convergence between comput-
ers and telecommunications).
259. See supra note 194.
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